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ABSTRACT
With climate change a present reality, governments are confronting the need
to adapt their regulatory planning processes to withstand new and uncertain
climate risks. This Article provides three new resources to support this essential
work. First, it develops a new standard for assessing the quality of climate ad-
aptation decisionmaking, focusing on defining the problem, quantifying adapta-
tion benefits, and evaluating equitable distribution of risk. Second, it reviews
California's climate adaptation policy development efforts between 1988 and
2018-from the state's early efforts to study the problem, to later attempts at
statewide strategic planning, until more recent work to integrate adaptation
into existing regulatory processes-and applies the new assessment s andard to
illuminate many of the challenges that California has confronted. Third, the
Article presents four case studies from California's electric power regulatory
sector-electric grid reliability planning processes, wildfire risk mapping,
coastal generator siting, and rate case risk costing-to demonstrate the difficul-
ties inherent in incorporating climate-relevant data into complex technical pro-
ceedings in a transparent and consistent fashion. A hope exists that lawmakers,
policymakers, planners, and regulators can learn from California's three deca-
des of hard work on the climate adaptation problem, build on California's suc-
cesses, avoid California's mistakes, and, ultimately, develop more resilient and
transparent regulatory adaptation strategies.
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INTRODUCTION: ADAPTATION, CALIFORNIA, AND THE GRID
"Climate change," or "anthropogenic climate change," is the result of humanity's
release into Earth's atmosphere of gases such as carbon dioxide and methane that
absorb and re-emit thermal-wavelength radiation (collectively, "greenhouse gases,"
or "GHGs") in levels sufficient to change those gases' atmospheric concentrations
and, thus, Earth's global average surface temperatures, relative to pre-industrial lev-
els, with resulting unpredictable changes to earth's atmospheric processes. This phe-
nomenon was first predicted in 1896.1 It has been the subject of worldwide scientific
investigation for the last several decades,2 and it is generally accepted by the
research community that, lacking a strategic response, anthropogenic climate
change threatens to materially disrupt many human systems.3
"Adaptation" describes one primary strategy for responding to climate
change.4 Adaptation approaches assume that climate change will occur, and
1. Svante Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the
Ground, 41 LONDON, EDINBURGH, & DUBLIN PHIL. MAG. & J. OF SCI. 237-76 (1896).
2. See G.A. Res. 45/53, U.N. GAOR, 43d. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 at 133 (Dec. 6, 1988)
(requesting investigation by an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC")), and subsequent
research timeline, https://perma.cc/H9CU-C9L3.
3. See, e.g., WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 - IMPACTS, ADAPTATION,
AND VULNERABILITY: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 6, 32 (2014).
4. See Philipp Schmidt-Thom6, Climate Change Adaptation, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CLIMATE SC. (2017) (surveying definitions), https://perma.cc/TG7G-PRLE.
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typically involve either proactive planning to adjust human systems to those
changes, or reactive adjustment of human systems following climate-related fail-
ures.5 At the present time, adaptation strategies are relatively underdeveloped, as
compared to programs designed to reduce GHG emissions.6 However, it is
becoming increasingly apparent that his will have to change in the coming
decades.
Given the slow progress of worldwide emissions reduction efforts, the world's
climate is changing. This, in turn, is stressing built systems (and vice versa), often
with catastrophic results. In California, for example, the 2017 and 2018 wildfire
seasons, the most destructive in the state's history, involved interactions between
downed electrical equipment, heat-induced (and thus climate change-induced)
wind storms,7 and drought-stressed (and thus climate change-stressed) vegeta-
tion,' as mediated (possibly poorly) by state- and utility-scale grid management
policies and practices.9 Natural disasters in other parts of the country, including
New York City's Hurricane Sandy and Houston's Hurricane Harvey, have dem-
onstrated the vulnerability of coastal built environments to increasing storm
flooding, again associated with climate change.10 In order to weather the coming
storms, regulatory processes that govern built infrastructure systems will need to
integrate climate change impacts into their decisionmaking.
To assist in the development of climate-sensitive regulatory planning proc-
esses, this Article seeks to construct three new resources: (1) a set of standards by
which to evaluate efforts to incorporate climate adaptation into policymaking and
regulatory decisionmaking; (2) a critical assessment of one state's efforts to de-
velop climate adaptation policy and guidance; and (3) four case studies that
5. The other two primary strategies are mitigation (reducing GHG emissions) and geoengineering
(direct interventions into earth systems). See Annex II: Glossary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS
REPORT - CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 123, 125 (2014).
6. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363 (2010) (recognizing the "adaptation gap" phenomenon).
7. See Yufang Jin et al., Identification of Two Distinct Fire Regimes in Southern California:
Implications for Economic Impact and Future Change, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETT. 094005 (2015)
(contribution of climate change to Santa Ana wind-driven fires); John T. Abatzoglou & A. Park
Williams, Impact of Anthropogenic Climate Change on Wildfire Across Western U.S. Forests, 113
PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 11,770-75 (2016).
8. CALIFORNIA WILDFIRE STRIKE FORCE, WILDFIRES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CALIFORNIA'S ENERGY
FUTURE 1 (Apr. 12, 2019).
9. See California North Bay Fire Cases, Jud. Council Coord. Proc. No. 4955 (Cal. Super. Ct. San
Francisco) (consolidating claims alleging PG&E's liability for California wildfires). Climate change
also may have contributed to the storm that threatened the integrity of California's Oroville Dam. Daniel
L. Swain et al., Increasing Precipitation Volatility in Twenty-First-Century California, 8 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 427,427 (2018).
10. James Bradbury & C. Forbes Tompkins, New Report Connects 2012 Extreme Weather Events to
Human-Caused Climate Change, WORLD RES. INST. BLOG (Sept. 6, 2013), https://perma.cc/S6GE-
HC5C; Henry Fountain, Scientists Link Hurricane Harvey's Record Rainfall to Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/V9XF-8NPR.
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examine whether and to what extent climate change has been integrated into
ongoing regulatory proceedings. These three resources correspond to this
Article's three Parts.
Part I examines the five Assessment Reports prepared by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") between 1990 and 2014. This Article draws
from them a set of principles by which climate adaptation regulatory decisionmaking
may be assessed. These principles are organized according to frameworks used by
policy analysts, focusing on criteria assessing effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and
feasibility-i.e., will a proposed solution work, what will it cost, will it be fair, and
can it be done? The IPCC Assessment Reports provide a rich series of suggestions
for approaching these questions within the context of climate change adaptation.
Part II examines climate adaptation policymaking within the state of
California between 1988 and 2018. California is the most populous U.S. state,
and, as of this writing, the sixth largest economy in the world; it has a long history
as a leader in environmental regulatory development and expertise; and it has
been working on climate adaptation policy for thirty years. Furthermore, as a sub-
national jurisdiction, California is responsible for providing policy development
and guidance down to the local level. And yet its size and regulatory capacities
have also made its climate regulatory programs tate-of-the-art on the world
stage. Even so, California has struggled to develop a workable climate change ad-
aptation policy framework.
Finally, Part III examines four regulatory processes in California's electric
power sector into which climate adaptation considerations could have been
injected. The electric grid involves complex and multi-scalar decisionmaking
processes requiring coordination and cooperation among multiple agencies, gov-
erning a single built system relied upon by a huge population. Transmission grid
reliability, wildfire management, power plant siting, and recent attempts at risk
management regulation are all considered. Each proceeding handled the question
of climate change differently, and together they demonstrate that there is not yet
any coherent strategy for regulatory integration, although that may be changing.
Ultimately, this review demonstrates the enormous challenges that lie ahead as
long-term planning and regulatory processes contend with the loss of "stationarity"-
the assumption that the world will remain the same. Parts I, II, and III, together, dem-
onstrate that climate adaptation policy development has often failed to address neces-
sary questions, and that even very sophisticated regulatory processes are struggling to
incorporate climate information. The hope is that, as policymakers and lawmakers
confront the challenges posed by the physical reality of climate change, California's
efforts can serve to show what has and has not worked to date.
I. A STANDARD OF REVIEW
Climate adaptation is a nascent regulatory field and there are no generally
accepted standards for assessing the qualities of any given effort. This Part
2020] 23I
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proposes a "standard of review" adapted from the policy analysis disciplines and
develops the general standard by reference to the relevant discussions and find-
ings of the synthesis reports published between 1990 and 2014 by the IPCC. In
brief, this Part argues that climate adaptation decisionmaking is susceptible to
multi-criteria decision analysis tools-particularly investigations into effective-
ness, costs and benefits, equity, and feasibility. The analysis collects and arranges
the decision criteria developed in the IPCC reports within that framework to pro-
pose standards for assessing regulatory decisionmaking on this topic.
To begin developing a standard for assessment, this Part proceeds from the
position that climate adaptation regulatory policy is a problem of decisionmaking
under uncertainty. Climate change's inherent uncertainty is one of the key attrib-
utes that makes it a "super wicked" problem for regulators to address." Even
where general trends may be increasingly subject to accurate prediction, infra-
structure and social planners require a much greater degree of spatial accuracy
than is currently possible. In deciding whether to build a dam, it matters a great
deal whether climate change will greatly increase, or greatly decrease, precipita-
tion in a given watershed-knowledge that precipitation will almost certainly
change in an unknown direction is insufficient. Considering how to adapt to cli-
mate change, therefore, is a process that requires public decisionmakers to take
action with insufficient information. It is, then, a classic tough problem of policy
analysis, susceptible to policy-oriented decision analysis frameworks.
One such framework is "multi-criteria decision analysis." This is a "generic
term for a collection of systematic approaches developed specifically to support
the systematic evaluation of alternatives in terms of multiple and often conflicting
objectives."1 2 Given any question about what should be done, this decision analy-
sis framework says that it is possible to examine alternatives according to a range
of criteria, including especially effectiveness, economic impact, equity, and feasi-
bility.13 Comparing evidence of past decision frameworks to an idealized multi-
criteria analytical approach allows an assessment of the quality of past
decisionmaking.
A. STANDARDS IN THE IPCC ASSESSMENT REPORTS
Between 1990 and 2014 five worldwide literature reviews were published that
contained, among many other things, a developing documentation of best
11. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present o
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009).
12. Mika Karttunen et al., Structuring Problems for Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis in Practice: A
Literature Review of Method Combinations, 263 EUR. J. OF OPERATIONAL RES. 1-17, 1 (2017), and
works cited.
13. See generally Michael E. Kraft & Scott R. Furlong, Assessing Policy Alternatives, in PUBLIC
POLICY: POLITICS, ANALYSIS, AND ALTERNATIVES (4th ed. 2012); Eugene Bardach, Selecting the
Criteria, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, THE EIGHTFOLD PATH TO MORE EFFECTIVE
PROBLEM SOLVING (4th ed. 2012).
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practices for climate change adaptation policy development. The IPCC published
its First Assessment Report ("ART") in 1990; Second Assessment Report
("AR2") in 1995; Third Assessment Report ("AR3") in 2001; Fourth Assessment
Report ("AR4") in 2007; and Fifth Assessment Report ("AR5") in 2014. In each,
the IPCC summarized the state of worldwide research on climate change, its
impacts, and potential responses. This section gathers and arranges the recom-
mendations of the various Assessment Reports within the criteria categories,
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and feasibility, to further develop standards for
reviewing and assessing climate change adaptation policy and regulatory deci-
sionmaking. These analyses, taken together, support the formation of an evalua-
tive rubric against which climate change adaptation decisionmaking may be
assessed.
1. The IPCC First Assessment Report (1990)
AR1 was completed in 1990, in three parts, corresponding to the IPCC's
three "working groups." ART Working Group I ("WG1") explained the climate
science consensus,14 ART Working Group II ("WG2") assessed the impacts of
climate change," and ART Working Group III ("WG3") discussed potential
response strategies.16 ART WG3 was split into topical subgroups, which did not
all discuss adaptation. However, Chapters 5 and 6, on coastal zone management
and resource use and management, respectively, included substantial climate ad-
aptation discussions.
The authors of ART WG3 Report Chapter 5 (Coastal Zone Management) (the
"CZM Chapter")17 approached the adaptation problem as one of options categori-
zation and analysis. They identified among themselves the range of CZM adapta-
tion alternatives that had been discussed up to that point and reduced them into
three analytical categories: retreat, accommodation, and protection.18 In plain lan-
guage, these three approaches were to abandon coastal development, put it on
stilts, or build walls around it. The authors then suggested universal evaluative
criteria for choosing between these options. In assessing how to handle any given
coastal area, they suggested that decisionmakers ought to consider what the land
is being used for, the importance of those activities along all possible values
(environmental, social, economic, etc.), the financial and political ability to
respond, the cost of various options, the effectiveness of those options, their cost-
effectiveness, how well the option performs under uncertainty, and "equity,"
14. IPCC WG1, CLIMATE CHANGE-THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (1990) [hereinafter ARI
WG1 REPORT], https://perma.cc/D785-GZ4B.
15. IPCC WG2, CLIMATE CHANGE-THE IPCC IMPACTS ASSESSMENT (1990) [hereinafter ARI WG2
REPORT], https://perma.cc/B67M-APFB.
16. IPCC WG3, CLIMATE CHANGE-THE IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES (1990) [hereinafter ARI
WG3 REPORT], https://perma.cc/Y6NM-PHUB.
17. J. Dronkers et al., Coastal Zone Management, in ARI WG3 REPORT, supra note 16, 129-59.
18. Id. at 146-49.
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which was undefined.19 The authors also noted that "[s]uccessful coastal manage-
ment programmes [will] require public education to gain broad-based support,
and public participation to ensure equal representation of interests."20
Although the CZM Chapter authors did not draw attention to this aspect of
their approach, they did not pre-select the "correct" adaptation alternative.
Rather, they attempted to collect all known options for addressing a single signifi-
cant climate change impact (sea level rise) to simplify further analysis.2 1 They
did not become caught in the traps of endless impact assessment, uncertainty
paralysis, or impossible attempts to combine the costs of carbon reduction and ad-
aptation. Rather, they tackled the questions following impact assessment,
acknowledged uncertainty without trying to resolve it, and moved on to building
a platform for public discussion of the pros and cons of various responses if the
impacts come. This approach is remarkable for its rarity.
AR1 WG3 Report Chapter 6 (Resource Use and Management),22 in contrast,
offered a different taxonomy, within which was hidden telling conclusions about
competing values-a much more typical presentation. The resource management
authors categorized adaptation options into those that provided additional infor-
mation ("Category A"), those that are "economically justifiable" under present
circumstances ("Category B"), and those that are costly and should only be con-
sidered once Category A options have reduced uncertainty ("Category C").23 As
with contemporaneous work in California, this taxonomy was built on the
unquestioned and possibly mistaken assumption that additional data will reduce
uncertainty to improve future decisionmaking. It also selected, without debate or
examination, present-day economic valuation as the primary decision criterion
for immediate action.
Chapters 5 and 6 also each took a stand on how to deal with uncertainty. The
CZM Chapter stated, without further discussion, that adaptation options should
be judged based on their "performance under uncertainty."25 The Resource Use
Chapter approach provided two additional, related criteria: whether an option is
"flexible," meaning adjustable in light of new knowledge and successful in all
19. Id. at 158 tbl. 5.6 ("Criteria for Allocation of Resources"), including, inter alia, "The importance
of the coastal area in terms of: urgency of risk; proportion of national land area; population affected;
environmental importance; economic importance; social and cultural importance; and regional
importance;" "the cost of the option;" "the effectiveness of the option;" etc.
20. Id. at 146.
21. "The responses required to protect human life and property fall broadly into three categories:
retreat, accommodation, and protection." Id. at 135.
22. R. Pentland et al., Resource Use and Management, in ARI WG3 REPORT, supra note 16, at 161-
205.
23. Id. at 168-70. "Economically justifiable" is defined as including "ensuring cost-effectiveness and
economic efficiency, and consideration of opportunity costs-aspects that are likely to be met if it
provides other non-climate-related benefits, [and] consider[ing] the broad range of social and
environmental factors." Id. at 168.
24. See Section II.A, infra.
25. ARI WG3 REPORT, supra note 16, at 158.
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possible future situations, and whether it is "timely,' 26 meaning neither too early
nor too late. However, neither criterion was discussed in detail.
2. The IPCC Second Assessment Report (1995)
Unlike AR1, which separated impact and response between WG2 and WG3,
AR2's WG2 took on impact, mitigation, and adaptation in combination, while
AR2 WG3 summarized the growing literature on climate change's socioeco-
nomic implications. AR2 represented a significant step forward in adaptation pol-
icy development by collecting, for the first time in one place, many of the
technical concepts that would be useful for future adaptation policy development.
a. AR2 WG2 Report: Impacts and Responses
The goal of the AR2 WG2 Report" was to assess the current state of knowl-
edge on the potential impacts of climate change, and then to "review[] available
information on the technical and economic feasibility of a range of potential ad-
aptation and mitigation strategies.''28 To make the task manageable, the report
relied upon-and in the process, mainstreamed-three key analytical concepts:
1) sensitivity (how sensitive is a system to climate change?), 2) adaptive capacity
(how capable of change is the system?), and 3) vulnerability (given this informa-
tion, how susceptible is the system to harm?).29 However, these concepts pre-
sented serious definitional and measurement challenges, and they did not serve as
strict organizing foundations for most of the rest of the report.
Instead, the AR2 WG2 Report's adaptation analysis was incorporated into indi-
vidual chapters that each examined climate impacts on various resources, and
assessed, to varying degrees, humanity's response options. The chapters on ran-
gelands, coastal zones, industry and energy, human settlement, agriculture, and
water resources each followed this pattern and included some discussion of adap-
tation (other chapters addressed only impact assessment, or only impacts and mit-
igation options).30 Each chapter took a different approach. For example, a short
section in the rangelands chapter noted that pastoral societies may need to
respond and recommended adaptive intervention into food species reliance.31
The industry and energy chapter discussed, among other things, the possibilities
26. Id. at 168.
27. AR2 WG2, Climate Change 1995-Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change:
Scientific-Technical Analysis (1995) [ hereinafter AR2 WG2 REPORT], https://perma.cc/X7Q2-QTUP.
28. Id. at ix.
29. Id. at ix, 4-5, 23-25.
30. See id. chs. 2 ("Rangelands in a Changing Climate: Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation"), 9
("Coastal Zones and Small Islands"), 11 ("Industry, Energy, and Transportation: Impacts and
Adaptation"), 12 ("Human Settlements in a Changing Climate: Impacts and Adaptation"), 13
("Agriculture in a Changing Climate: Impacts and Adaptation"), and 14 ("Water Resources
Management").
31. Id. at 47-48.
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for voluntary adaptation; the challenges to adaptation posed by long-lived assets;
the need for good information in adaptation planning; the challenges posed by
short-term planning horizons; the alleged need for an integrated approach to
assessment of impacts, mitigation, and adaptation; the potential need for adapta-
tion in construction industries and transportation infrastructure planning, adapta-
tion capacity to gradual and sudden changes; and ultimately concluded that the
literature on adaptation in industry was "weak."3 2 Many of the other discussions
were more brief. '
As in the ART, the most cogent adaptation analysis was the CZM assessment.34
The CZM authors summarized the results of vulnerabilities assessments and con-
cluded that despite some success, "vulnerability assessment has been less suc-
cessful in assessing the range of response options to deal with the problems of
climate change."35 The chapter then returned to ART's three-category framework
for analysis. The CZM authors also produced the first significant discussion of so-
called "barriers" to adaptation. They began by proposing that the solution to ad-
aptation was to build capacity for integrated coastal zone management, by which
they meant a strategy for integrating all possible considerations into some unified
decision framework.36 They emphasized the need for good leadership, supportive
institutions, technical capacity, and management instruments.37 At the national
scale, they provided another list of important evaluative criteria for feasibility of
implementation: available technological, human, and financial resources; social
and political acceptability; and legality. With this review, the CZM authors dem-
onstrated that beyond vulnerability assessment, it is possible to attempt to collect
and organize alternatives, analyze the costs and benefits of each along uniform
criteria, survey what has been adopted and what has not (and why), discuss feasi-
bility in a conceptually rigorous manner, and assess needs for future analyses
along these lines.
b. AR2 WG3 Report: Analytical Concept Development
The AR2 WG3 Report 38 took a very different approach: to summarize and
synthesize the state of socioeconomic literature on climate change. In doing so, it
produced a significant and important set of analytical lenses through which to
32. Id. at 369-70, 379, 382, 391, 394.
33. Id. at 416-21 (identifying adaptation options in numerous ectors while concluding that here is
no good way to evaluate them); 452-55 (in the context of agriculture, discussing adaptive capacity); and
481 (in the context of water resource management, stating that no real developments have occurred
since AR1, and urging adherence to the principles stated there).
34. See Luitzen Bijlsma et al., Coastal Zones and Small Islands, in AR2 WG2 REPORT, supra note
27, at 289-324; see esp. id. at 311-17 (discussing adaptation).
35. Id. at 311.
36. Id. at 315.
37. Id.
38. AR2 WG3, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995-ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(1995) [hereinafter AR2 WG3 REPORT], https://perma.cc/6REF-WEC9.
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consider adaptation. The challenge came in applying these concepts o adaptation
options, where the authors demurred: "possible trade-offs between implementa-
tion of mitigation and adaptation measures are important to consider in future
research."39 That said, the AR2 WG3 Report flagged many issues that may serve
to inform adaptation assessment.
First, Chapter 240 discussed decision analysis, a broadly descriptive term for
the collection of quantitative tools (e.g., expected utility theory, probabilities,
optimization) for decisionmaking under uncertainty. Given dispersed decision-
making, inconsistent and unquantifiable utilities, and unknown probabilities, the
authors concluded that "decision analysis cannot serve as the primary basis for
international climate change decision making," though it "suffers fewer problems
when used by individual countries to identify optimal national policies."41 It also
noted that given the likely failure to identify universally acceptable optimal solu-
tions, final decisions likely will require "negotiation and compromise,"42 with all
of the game theory implications that this implies. As an alternative decision
framework, the authors suggested sequential decisionmaking approaches similar
to ART WG3's "flexibility" criterion, involving learning from incremental action,
while preserving options to the extent possible.43
Second, Chapters 3 and 4' provided concrete suggestions for incorporating eq-
uity into adaptation. Chapter 3 surveyed the lack of equity analysis in prior inter-
national climate contexts, and suggested guiding principles, along the lines of
polluter-pays, for the international context.45 The authors pointed out that at the
sub-national level, ethical principles often are incorporated into liability rules,
which typically should form a part of an ethical analysis of the topic. In addition,
they offered concrete suggestions for furthering equity analysis: cost studies
should begin to ascribe cost to bearing risk, and policymakers should support de-
velopment of climate impact insurance.46 Chapter 4 was entirely devoted to the
special case of intergenerational equity, and the role that the discount rate has on
39. Id. at 12.
40. K.J. Arrow et al., Decision-Making Frameworks for Addressing Climate Change, in AR2 WG3
REPORT, supra note 38, at 53-77.
41. Id. at 57; and see esp. 62-65 (§ 2.3.2, on decision analysis and climate change).
42. Id. at 57.
43. Id. at 68, quoting Alexander Shlyakhter et al., Integrated Risk Analysis of Global Climate
Change, 30:8 CHEMOSPHERE 1585-1618 (1995).
44. T. Banuri et al, Equity and Social Considerations, and K.J. Arrow et al, Intertemporal Equity,
Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in AR2 WG3 REPORT, supra note 38, at 78-124, 125-44.
45. Id. at 101 ("[there is a] need to develop general rules of international law regarding liability and
compensation. However, in the absence of new rules of liability, the traditional '"fault-based" rules of
responsibility of international law could provide a basis for vulnerable, generally poorer, states
adversely affected by climate change to receive compensation from richer states whose past and present
emissions of greenhouse gases have caused environmental harm. The issue of historical emissions could
be of direct relevance here, as climate impacts are a function of atmospheric concentrations, which
depend strongly on cumulative emissions.").
46. Id. at 102.
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net present valuation of alternatives across long periods of time. It concluded that
there is no consensus between two competing viewpoints: those that seek to mini-
mize impact on future generations, and those that seek to maximize resources
available to future generations.47
Chapter 1748 focused on insurance and banking and introduced risk analysis
concepts to a degree far beyond all other discussions to that date. The insurance
industry was reported to be aware of increasing trends in extreme events, disaster
intensity, and the resulting financial losses of climate-driven weather events.49 As
of AR2, the industry was already adopting its own adaptation strategies: the tradi-
tional methods of restricting coverage, transferring risk, controlling losses (e.g.,
requiring better resiliency standards to insure), and adjusting premiums to reflect
new risks.50 They were also considering novel approaches such as building disas-
ter reserves, taking an active role in educating stakeholders about risk, and work-
ing with government and international bodies to support development practices
that reduce risk. Banks were tightening lending requirements based on climate
risk. 2 These strategies are at the heart of the special challenges that uncertainty
poses to adaptation planning: the financial services sector must function within
high degrees of risk, and the control strategies it adopts may be relevant
elsewhere.
AR2 WG3's primary adaptation output was intended to be Chapter 7, but that
work paid little attention to adaptation.5 3 It concluded: "There are no comprehen-
sive surveys of the various adaptation options and their costs, probably because
adaptation covers such a broad range of potential action and also because of the
large uncertainties surrounding these options."5 4 There was a brief discussion of
"what to adapt to" and "how to adapt," but the chapter ended by stating only that
an "integrating approach" is needed." Similarly, Chapter 11's brief discussion
concluded that "[a]ny adaptation policies should be designed in concert with miti-
gation policies."5 6
47. Id. at 140-41. AR2 WG3 REPORT Chapter 5 discussed how cost-benefit analysis can be applied to
climate problems. Unfortunately, its analysis was limited to mitigation only, and did not address the
special valuation problems of adaptation in detail. Id. at 162, 164. Chapter 6, concerned with damage
valuation, discussed the difficulties of valuing adaptation in integrated assessment models. Id. at 184,
187-88.
48. Andrew F. Dlugolecki et al., Financial Services, in AR2 WG3 REPORT, supra note 38.
49. Id. at 545-47.
50. Id. at 548-51.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 553.
53. C.J. Jepma et al., A Generic Assessment of Response Options, in AR2 WG3 REPORT, supra note
38, at 236-48.
54. Id. at 249.
55. Id. at 253.
56. B B.S. Fisher et al., An Economic Assessment of Policy Instruments for Combatting Climate
Change, in AR2 WG3 REPORT, supra note 38, at 399-439,411-12.
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3. The IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001)
Between AR2 (1995) and AR3 (2001), the nations of the world adopted the
Kyoto Protocol7 and agreed, in principle, to a worldwide greenhouse gas emis-
sions mitigation strategy. In the meantime, AR3's authors made significant pro-
gress towards understanding climate adaptation policy analysis. During AR2,
WG2 handled impacts and responses together, while WG3 discussed socioeco-
nomic aspects of analysis. For AR3, mitigation and adaptation were finally
separated-AR3 WG2 handled vulnerability and adaptation while WG3 handled
mitigation. Even so, most of WG2's work for AR3 focused on impact evaluation
and vulnerability assessment, and only a very small amount of work was devoted
to the special problems of adaptation. Regarding adaptation specifically, the AR3
WG2 Report5 8 included, once again, a combination of sectoral analyses and syn-
thesis reports.
a. AR3 WG2 Report Chapter 18: Climate Adaptation as Policy Analysis
AR3 WG2 Report Chapter 1859 contained the first treatment of climate adapta-
tion as a generalizable policy problem; AR1 WG2 Report Chapter 5 had treated it
as a policy problem in the context of coastal zone management only. AR3 WG2
Report Chapter 18 discussed the nature of the problem, the processes by which
policy options could be identified, and the evaluative criteria that could be
applied. In general, it supported evaluating adaptation measures using a mixture
of cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness, risk-benefit, and multi-criteria methods, and it
summarized the confused state of cost estimates.60
Chapter 18 also sought to categorize the kinds of criteria that agencies had
been applying to guide adaptation strategy and planning: favor actions that
increase robustness of infrastructure designs, increase flexibility (e.g. adjusting
more often or reducing planned operating lives), reduce other system stresses
(and so provide room for adaptation), identify and reverse maladaptation, and
improve public awareness and preparedness.61 In general, the authors upported
an iterative management approach involving information collection, planning,
and design incorporating policy criteria and development objectives, implemen-
tation, monitoring, and evaluation.62
57. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997,
U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
58. AR3 WG2, Climate Change 2001-Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2001), [hereinafter
AR3 WG2 REPORT], https://perma.cc/E89M-CHQT.
59. Barry Smit et al., Adaptation to Climate Change in the Context of Sustainable Development and
Equity, in AR3 WG2 REPORT, supra note 58, at 877-912.
60. Id. at 884-85.
61. Id. at 891.
62. Id. at 892 (citing Klein et al., Coastal adaptation to climate change: Can the IPCC Technical
Guidelines be applied?, 4(304) MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOB. CHANGE 239-52
(1999)).
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b. AR3 WG2 Report Chapter 2: Decision Frameworks and the Poor State of the
Art
AR3 WG2 Report Chapter 263 contained a five-page discussion of climate ad-
aptation "decision analytic frameworks"-specifically decision analysis, cost-
benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, and the "policy exercise" approach,
that were available to guide adaptation decisionmaking under uncertainty. It
stated:
The proper mode to conduct analyses to support adaptation decisions . . . is se-
quential decisionmaking under uncertainty and considering future learning. The
principal task is to identify adaptation strategies that will take regions or sectors
to the best possible position for revising those strategies at later dates in light of
new information about expected patterns of regional climate change, socioeco-
nomic development, and changes in climate-sensitive sectors. Consequently,
applications of all [decision analysis frameworks] in adaptation studies should
be formulated in the sequential decisionmaking mode."
It also defended using cost-benefit analysis. While cost-benefit analysis
criticisms were "largely valid ... it is still better to get at least the measurable
components right and complement them with a combination of judgments on
hard-to-measure items and sensitivity tests to assess their implications than to
abandon the whole method because it does not get everything perfect."65 It added
that cost-effectiveness analysis could also be useful, provided that all parties
could define the public good that is the policy output-after which it could be
possible to determine an optimal strategy to achieve it. It also noted:
[WG2] has reviewed a huge volume of climate impact assessment studies con-
ducted to date. Most of these studies investigate possible implications of cli-
mate change for a single economic sector or environmental component. An
increasing, yet still small, fraction of these studies lists options to alleviate
impacts, but few take even the next step of exploring direct and indirect costs
of those adaptation options. Even fewer studies provide comprehensive assess-
ments of direct and indirect benefits.66
In other words, WG2 conceived of adaptation policy development on a spec-
trum, from studies that stopped at impact assessment to comprehensive assess-
ments of the costs and benefits of alternatives. Much of the work done to that date
had been of the former type.
63. Q.K. Ahmad et al., Methods and Tools, in AR3 WG2 REPORT, supra note 58, at 105-43.
64. Id. at 134.
65. Id. at 135.
66. Id. at 136.
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4. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007)
Between 2001 and 2007 the United States declined to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, and global GHG emissions increased steadily. Meanwhile, the AR4
WG2 Report67 represented a quiet turning point in adaptation analysis. Prior to
2007, the IPCC assessment reports had largely not treated adaptation as a policy
problem, except to the extent described above. Starting in 2007, adaptation was
treated mostly as a policy problem, with much effort pointed toward studying
decisionmaking challenges in this context.
The AR4 WG2 Report Chapter 268 reviewed developments in assessment
methodology between 2001 and 2007. It explained that a need for policy-
relevant information had driven exploration of new assessment methods,
particularly incorporation of risk assessment and management methods into
decisionmaking. "A major aim of [new] assessment approaches is to man-
age, rather than overcome, uncertainty. . . . Another important trend has
been the move from research-driven agendas to assessments tailored towards
decision-making, where decision-makers and stakeholders either participate
in or drive the assessment."69 Regarding adaptation assessment, WG2 high-
lighted "the difficulty of establishing a general methodology for adaptation
assessment due to the great diversity of analytical methods employed."70
From scenario-based impact assessments incorporating adaptation as an
input, the state of practice had moved through multi-criteria analysis into de-
velopment of indicators of adaptive capacity, organizational studies, tech-
nology assessments, and risk assessment.1
There was still very little progress developing the tools needed to perform
multi-criteria policy analysis. Later in the report, WG2 concluded with high con-
fidence that "comprehensive estimates of adaptation costs and benefits are cur-
rently lacking," with only a "small methodological literature on the assessment of
costs and benefits in the context of climate change adaptation," and with very
high confidence that "there are substantial limits and barriers to adaptation. "72
"The literature on adaptation costs and benefits remained quite limited and frag-
mented in terms of sectoral and regional coverage.' 7
AR4 also used a "barriers" framework to attempt to assess the status of adapta-
tion initiatives. Seeking to create a worldwide classification system, it posited five
major categories of adaptation barriers: (1) ecological/physical, (2) technological,
67. AR4 WG2, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 - IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY (2007)
[hereinafter AR4 WG2 REPORT], https://perma.cc/85AS-U7AY.
68. Timothy R. Carter et al., New Assessment Methods and the Characterization of Future
Conditions, in AR4 WG2 REPORT, supra note 67, at 133-171.
69. Id. at 136.
70. Id. at 138.
71. Id. at 137.
72. AR4 WG2 REPORT, supra note 67, at 719.
73. Id. at 724.
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(3) cognitive/psychological, (4) financial, and (5) social/cultural. WG2 also recog-
nized that adaptive capacity was not turning out to be a particularly useful analyti-
cal tool for understanding barriers to adaptation:
Further evidence from Europe and other parts of the globe suggests that high
adaptive capacity may not automatically translate into successful adaptations
to climate change. Research on adaptation to changing flood risk in Norway,
for example, has shown that high adaptive capacity is countered by weak
incentives for proactive flood management. Despite increased attention to
potential adaptation options, there is less understanding of their feasibility,
costs, effectiveness, and the likely extent of their actual implementation.?"
In summary, by 2007 the world recognized that adaptation was a fundamen-
tally different kind of decision problem than was mitigation and had begun to de-
velop generalized theories for why adaptation was difficult, coalescing around a
barriers framework with the realization that adaptive capacity, the previously pre-
vailing paradigm, was largely not useful.
5. The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014)
The AR5 WG2 Report5 continued to track efforts to develop adaptation deci-
sionmaking processes. Chapter 1476 presented a new generalized taxonomy for
adaptation options: "structural/physical" options (engineered systems, new tech-
nologies, ecological management, public services), "social" options (educational
programs, informational programs, and preparatory/accommodation programs),
and "institutional" options (financial incentives, legal standards, and public plan-
ning efforts).7 7 This taxonomy was not intended to be comprehensive, and the
authors noted that many options might cross-categorize.
Regarding the selection between options, the authors noted that a "variety of
systematic techniques have been developed for selecting options," but that
they "do not account for a range of critical factors such as leadership, institu-
tions, resources, and barriers."78 The authors recognized that cost-benefit anal-
ysis requires "valuation of non-market costs and benefits, which can be
impractical."79 Ultimately, they noted that current practice had emphasized no-
regrets, low-regrets, and win-win options, and that multi-criteria analysis was
used sporadically.80
74. Id. at 733 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
75. AR5 WG2, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY (2014)
[hereinafter AR5 WG2 REPORT], https://perna.cc/JZ4Z-L7PN.
76. Ian R. Noble et al., Adaptation Needs and Options, in AR5 WG2 REPORT, supra note 75, at 833-
868.
77. Id. at 844-50.
78. Id. at 849.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 836, 849.
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The report also collected the decision criteria that had been used to date, begin-
ning with the three most familiar: "effective in reducing vulnerability and
increasing resilience," "efficient (increase benefits and reduce costs)," and "equi-
table, especially to vulnerable groups."81 Further criteria included that the options
be integrated into broader social programs, built with stakeholder participation,
consistent with prevailing social norms and traditions, the result of legitimate
processes, environmentally and socially sustainable, flexible, appropriately
scoped, likely to avoid maladaptation, robust, consistent with available resources,
able to consider transformative change, and coherent and synergistic with other
strategies.82
The report also stated that stakeholders "have found it difficult to clearly define
and identify precisely what constitutes adaptation, how to track its implementa-
tion and effectiveness, and how to distinguish it from effective development," in
part because there are "no common reference metrics."83 The authors discussed
the challenges in measuring vulnerability, resiliency, and adaptive capacity, and
they proposed measurements by which metrics themselves could be judged: valid
(unambiguous, well founded, well defined, accurate, precise, quality checked,
transparent, honest, with a known purpose), providing value (easy to understand,
relevant, responsive, actionable, disaggregatable, participatory, and with high in-
formation content), available, homogenous, periodically collected, consistent
over time, and spatially comprehensive.84 Ultimately, the authors concluded that
for years "the climate change community [had been] far from adopting common
standards, paradigms, or analytic language. This till appears to be true, making
the search for commonly accepted metrics, even within well-specified contexts, a
challenging task."85
Finally, AR5 WG2 Chapter 1786 provided information relevant o economic ef-
ficiency analysis. It explained that policy analysis had moved from traditional
cost-benefit analysis "to include consideration of non-monetary and non-market
measures, risks, inequities and behavioral biases, and barriers and limits and con-
sideration of ancillary benefits and costs."87 The report concluded that monetizing
benefits was sometimes impossible, and therefore that "any analysis [should] be
multi-metric, with part in monetary terms and other parts not, and some in precise
quantitative terms and others not." 88 It recommended real option analysis to cap-
ture costs and benefits together with the cost of delaying a decision, but
81. Id. at 850.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 853.
84. Id. at 855.
85. Id. at 857.
86. Muyeye Chambwera et al., Economics of Adaptation, in AR5 WG2 REPORT, supra note 75, at
945-77.
87. Id. at 948.
88. Id. at 951.
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concluded that "[m]ulti-metric decision making provides a broader frame-
work." 89 As of this writing, this was the last word on adaptation at the IPCC.
B. AN IDEALIZED FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT
The IPCC Assessment Reports provide a rich variety of assessment criteria by
which to examine climate change adaptation policy and regulation, although they
are dispersed across dozens of chapters in five very large reports. Arranged by
reference to the basic framework of multi-criteria policy analysis-examining
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and feasibility-the reports' disparate discus-
sions may be drawn together into a nuanced and descriptive set of considerations.
* Idealized effectiveness analysis. Any analysis of climate adaptation policy
should struggle to "define the problem," i.e., to craft a definition of what is
wrong that is measurably remediable. Proposals for action should also
explain exactly what the proposed outcome is supposed to be and how to
measure it, hopefully in a manner that is consistent with the problem state-
ment. If it is not possible to conduct cost-effectiveness comparisons (cost-
per-unit-outcome) between alternative proposals, decisionmakers probably
need to do further work.
* Idealized economic impact analysis. Any analysis of climate adaptation
policy should grapple with how to define the benefit side of adaptation
options. This is particularly the case where actions are being compared
against up-front costs to decide whether to proceed. Given that climate ad-
aptation is a decades-long process, it is also important that economic anal-
ysis clearly discloses the underlying decisions made about present value of
future expenses (i.e., the discount rate) and understands the implications of
different choices.
* Idealized equity analysis. Any analysis of climate adaptation policy should
include some attempt to assess the outcomes of various proposals for
inequitable impacts. Beyond traditional concepts of process and outcome
equity, the pervasive uncertainty in climate adaptation analysis suggests
that risk equity also must be addressed-possibly by attributing a cost
value to risk-bearing.
* Idealized feasibility analysis. Any analysis of climate adaptation policy
should interrogate assumptions and conclusions about what is and is not
possible, in order to ensure that alternatives are not prematurely discarded.
It should also confront institutional limitations that may pose barriers to
action-for example, a lack of leadership, institutional constraints, budget,
and other exogenous factors.
* Idealized process legitimacy. The processes that investigate these ques-
tions should involve all relevant stakeholders and should be transparent
and accessible.
89. Id. at 957. Scenario analysis, meanwhile, was proposed to study worst-case possibilities and be
evaluated according to maxi-min and mini-max regret criteria, or robustness. Id.
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Ideally, climate adaptation policy decisions would demonstrate a clear under-
standing of these decision processes.
II. ASSESSING CALIFORNIA'S CLIMATE ADAPTATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT-1988 TO
2018
Informed by the framework developed in Part I, this Part recounts and assesses
climate adaptation policy development in the state of California over the last
three decades. It examines each step along the way for potentially problematic
underlying assumptions, missed opportunities, and inconsistent or incoherent
approaches, and it demonstrates that California has struggled to develop a climate
adaptation policy that permits sufficient regulatory consideration of climate
change adaptation. The Part proceeds chronologically: Section A describes cli-
mate adaptation policy development in California from 1988 to 2005, when the
work was approached primarily as a research question; Section B describes the
period from 2005 to 2015, when the state shifted to a strategic planning frame-
work but struggled to develop workable guidance; and Section C covers 2015 to
2018, following a statewide mandate to integrate climate change adaptation con-
siderations into regulatory decisionmaking processes.
A. 1988 TO 2005: PUBLIC RESEARCH ORIGINS
California's climate adaptation policy development process began in 1988,
with the state's first climate law. Through the 1990s, the state established a
world-class climate change research program, but this program struggled to move
beyond impact assessment to tackle the hard questions of climate adaptation. By
2005, the state had developed significant climate expertise in the legislative and
executive branches of government and the technical research sector, but it had
not yet resolved the question of how to respond if mitigation efforts were
insufficient.
1. The First Legislative Directive: A.B. 4420 (1988)
In 1988, the California legislature enacted Assembly Bill ("A.B.") 4420,90 the
state's first law to address climate change. The one-page bill recognized the
potential for climate change to impact the state's resources and operations and
directed the California Energy Commission ("CEC"),91 in consultation with the
90. Cal. Assemb. B. ("A.B.") 4420 (1988) (Sher) ("An act relating to the State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Commission"), 1988 Cal. Stat. 5336. For an informative survey of
Assemblyman Sher's legislative contributions between 1988 and 2005, see W.M. Hanemann, How
California Came to Pass A.B. 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, DEPT. OF AG. & RES.
ECON., UCB CUDARE WORKING PAPERS (U.C. BERKELEY) (2007).
91. California created the California Energy Commission ("CEC") following the 1973 energy crisis
caused by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries' U.S. oil export embargo. The
Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, 1974 Cal. Stat. 500, § 2,
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University of California, the California Air Resources Board ("CARB"),92 the
California Department of Water Resources, and the California Department of
Food and Agriculture, to submit a report to the legislature and governor on how
climate change could impact California, and to provide "recommendations for
avoiding, reducing, and addressing" those impacts.93
The law's language did not include the word "adaptation," and subsequent his-
tory suggests that mitigation, rather than adaptation, was the Legislature's pri-
mary interest. But it did require the CEC to report on the state's options for
"addressing" the impacts of climate change, and one option is to adapt.
2. The First CEC Reports (1989 & 1991)
Following A.B. 4420, the CEC produced two reports: an interim report ("CEC
1989")94 and a final report ("CEC 1991").95 The final report examined response
options but was primarily devoted to mitigation policy. Adaptation was relegated
to a brief final chapter that compiled lists of potential policy interventions sug-
gested for further analysis by California state agencies.
The clearest message was that the state's development of climate adaptation
policy was initially stymied by the uncertainty of adaptation, resulting in recom-
mendations for further study to reduce uncertainty rather than accepting uncer-
tainty as a given.96 That is, California state government agencies could not
immediately say what California's climate adaptation policy goals should be,
what evaluative criteria should be used to judge alternatives, or what data would
be needed to support analysis along those criteria.
created the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (the CEC's full official
name) and tasked it with a wide variety of energy policy development, technical forecasting and
assessment, resource conservation, and alternative energy research duties. Id. (enacting Cal. Pub. Res.
Code Div. 15, §§ 25000 et seq.). The Legislature also required the CEC to certify construction of all
large power plants in the state-the agency's most public-facing regulatory function. Id. Between 1973
and 1988, the CEC's research portfolio had been expanded several times. See 1976 Cal. Stat. 1635
(large-scale renewables demonstrations); 1977 Cal. Stat. 3476 (passive thermal systems); 1978 Cal. Stat.
3331 (wind energy research program); 1978 Cal. Stat. 4543, § 2 (passive solar design competition);
1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 905, § 2 (agricultural solar design competition); and 1984 Cal. Stat. 4057, § 16
(biannual trends reporting).
92. California created the California Air Resources Board ("CARB") in 1967 to promote unified
action on the problem of air pollution. 1967 Cal. Stat. 3679, § 5 (the Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act)
(codified at Cal. Health & Safety Code Div. 26, §§ 39000 et seq.). By 1988, CARB's authority had been
expanded, particularly via 1975 Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 957 (significantly expanding Div. 26, including,
inter alia, creating an air pollution research program that reported to the legislature).
93. A.B. 4420 § 2.
94. CEC, P500-89-004, THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING IN CALIFORNIA (1989) [hereinafter CEC
1989].
95. CEC, P500-91-007, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
[hereinafter CEC 1991] (published in two volumes, but the two volumes contain identical information, with the
first being an executive summary version of the second; citations here are to the Volume II version).
96. Id. at 6-1.
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This, however, did not stop the CEC from choosing decision rules. The
report concluded that "adaptation policies should be designed so they can be
introduced incrementally as change occurs. Premature adaptation measures
may incur unnecessary costs, while large engineering projects may over-com-
mit or under-commit society in terms of the appropriate response level.''97 This
statement hides value judgments, including, among others, that taking costly
actions that in hindsight were not necessary wastes money and acting without
good information increases the likelihood of such outcomes. That is, the only
evaluative criterion offered by the CEC was present cost. Without any proposal
for measuring or comparing benefits, the state's first climate policy was, neces-
sarily, inaction.
In discussing its data collection program, the CEC made a further assumption:
although it had just said that it did not know how it could be done, the CEC was
sure that the goal of any future policy development would be to "compare the
economic costs of adaptation policies with mitigation policies."98 The idea was
that a climate change response strategy could be formulated as some optimal
combination of mitigation and adaptation actions. However, such an optimization
assumes that mitigation and adaptation can be compared, an assumption that fails
to account for several very difficult aspects of problem definition and measure-
ments of effectiveness. Mitigation can be expressed in terms of unit cost (for
example, dollars per megaton CO2 reduction), but adaptation may be unitless
and unmonetizable. Furthermore, mitigation strategies are capable of economic
benefit-side valuation (e.g., avoided social cost of carbon), while adaptation strat-
egies often are not, or rely on valuations that are so general or wide-ranging as to
be essentially meaningless.
Thus, as of CEC 1991 (and ART), California recognized uncertainty as a major
problem for adaptation policy development but had not considered best practices
for decisionmaking under uncertainty. There was no attempt to establish how to
define or measure adaptation values, or promote public input into these questions.
Rather, the strategy was to collect technical data, in the hope that it would reduce
uncertainty and somehow improve decisionmaking, which was imagined as a
process comparing two potentially incomparable sets of options.
3. The First PIER Research (1996 to 2003)
The CEC's next major climate report did not discuss climate change adaptation
at all,99 and the AR2 adaptation analyses passed without official comment in the
state. Nonetheless, the intervening years saw a significant expansion of the state's
climate policy development capacity in the form of a world-class climate research
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. CEC, P500-98-00IV1, 1997 GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
REDUCTION STRATEGIES FOR CALIFORNIA (1998), https://perma.cc/F6EA-4CMF.
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program. Following California's electric deregulatory initiative,100 regulators pre-
dicted that the state's electric utilities would no longer be motivated to fund pro-
social electric system research.101 Consequently, the California legislature
provided for a Public Interest Energy Research ("PIER") electricity rate sur-
charge to produce funds for electric system research under deregulation.10 2 Under
the CEC, the PIER program became a primary conduit for climate research fund-
ing in California.
In 1998, the CEC issued its First General Solicitation for PIER funds, which
included an environmental research program.0 3 The Electric Power Research
Institute ("EPRI"), a nonprofit funded and operated by U.S. electric utilities to
pool research efforts, was awarded $28.4 million to study climate change in
California.1 4 EPRI's work ran for five years and resulted in dozens of publica-
tions.105 Ultimately, however-and although an analysis had been part of its orig-
inal plan-EPRI equivocated on the question of how to approach climate adapta-
tion. It ended its CEC-funded research work with an impact assessment,
concluding that its work would probably be useful for future examinations of ad-
aptation alternatives. As stated succinctly in the report's executive summary:
"The results of the studies can be useful for examining adaptation needs, but no
100. E.g., Severin Borenstein and James Bushnell, Electricity Restructuring: Deregulation or
Reregulation? 23 REGULATION 46 (2000); CHRISTOPHER WEARE, THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS:
CAUSES AND POLICY OPTIONS (2003); Benjamin F. Hobbs & Shmuel S. Oren, Three Waves of U.S.
Reforms: Following the Path of Wholesale Electricity Market Restructuring, 17:1 IEEE POWER &
ENERGY MAG. 73 (2019).
101. See CPUC, D. 95-12-063 ("Opinion"), at 145-62 (Dec. 20, 1995), ftp://ftp2.cpuc.ca.gov/
LegacyCPUCDecisionsAndResolutions/Decisions/Decisions_D9507001_to_D9905 055/D9512063_
19951220_R9404031.pdf; D. 96-03-22 ("Interim Opinion"), at 26-28 (Mar. 14, 1996), ftp://
ftp2.cpuc.ca.gov/LegacyCPUCDecisionsAndResolutions/Decisions/Decisions_D9507001_to_D9905055/
D9603022_19960313_R9404031.pdf; WORKING GROUP REPORT ON PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT & DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITIES, P500-96-010 (Sept. 6, 1996).
102. A.B. 1890, 1996 Cal. Stat. 4488 (electric utility deregulation), as amended by S.B. 90, 1997 Cal.
Stat. 6495 (creating PIER); S.B. 1194, 2000 Cal. Stat. 7719 (addressing research funding); S.B. 1038,
2002 Cal. Stat. 2912 (five-year investment plan and selection criteria); S.B. 71, 2005 Cal. Stat. 1775,
1778-79 (requiring planning and reporting), S.B. 1250, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3724, 3733-34 (extending
program for five years); and A.B. 2267, 2008 Cal. Stat. 3861 (expressing priority for economic benefit).
PIER ended when the legislature failed to pass an extension bill in 2011 and was replaced by a similar
program at the CPUC. CPUC, Order Instituting Rulemaking, R.11-10-003, at 4 (Oct. 13, 2011), https://
perma.cc/TR4T-CF75 (initiating rulemaking to replace PIER); CPUC, D 11-12-035 (Dec. 21, 2011),
https://perma.cc/VT2K-AZF3 (establishing a new funded program for renewable energy research);
CPUC, D 12-05-037 (May 31, 2012), https://perma.cc/K5YJ-AAM9 (same).
103. See CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, QUARTERLY REPORT CONCERNING THE PUBLIC INTEREST ENERGY
RESEARCH PROGRAM 4 (Apr. 8, 1998), https://perma.cc/UUK3-6EDQ.
104. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT CONCERNING THE PUBLIC INTEREST ENERGY
RESEARCH PROGRAM 49-50 (P500-99-004, 1999), https://perma.cc/5NF2-EHUM.
105. Elec. Power Res. Inst., Summary of Benefits from Commission Funding of EPRI's Collaborative
Climate Research Program 1998-2002, att'd as App'x XVI to GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND
CALIFORNIA: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ECOSYSTEMS, HEALTH, AND THE ECONOMY (Aug. 2003),
https://perma.cc/28MR-66P5.
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specific study on adaptation was done for this assessment."106
This is the earliest example of what would become another very important hall-
mark of California's climate change adaptation policy development: expending
all available resources on assessment to the detriment of everything else. Efforts
at adaptation analysis are frequently bogged down in impact assessment, with lit-
tle left-invariably in the last pages or paragraphs-for the translation of those
assessed impacts into policy proposals, let alone an analysis of those proposals or
even an analysis framework. The (possibly quixotic) desire for more certainty
attracted recurring investigation into the same questions, and the very different
questions raised by adaptation policy-identification and evaluation of alterna-
tives that involve changes to currently-prevailing conceptions of, for example,
intra- and intergenerational equity, societal allocation of risk, timely decision-
making lacking sufficient information, and land use and property rights, as well
as the legal and political feasibility of implementing such alternatives-go unexa-
mined. EPRI's work would not be the last example of this phenomenon.
As of 2001, then, California's climate adaptation policy was what it had been
in 1988: to try to generate useful information, and, otherwise, to wait and see.
4. The CEC's Climate Change Research Plan (2001 to 2005)
With its first PIER studies ongoing, the CEC moved to solicit further climate
policy research.107 The agency commissioned research roadmaps,108 including, as
relevant here, an adaptation roadmap.109 However, the proposal combined adap-
tation and mitigation research under the broader efforts of integrated assessment
modeling. As such, the roadmap's focus was on economic equilibrium models
and the difficulties of incorporating adaptation policies into these models.
Consequently, the roadmap identified, in a general way, the need for improved
theory and practice to support incorporating impact assessment and adaptation
analysis into large-scale policy options models, but-again-did not take the op-
portunity to confront the more fundamental challenges posed by adaptation.110
106. ELEC. POWER RES. INST., GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND CALIFORNIA: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
FOR ECOSYSTEMS, HEALTH, AND THE ECONOMY 21 (Aug. 2003). As it turns out, this was not exactly true.
The research plan supported EPRI's larger climate research initiative, a part of which was an adaptation
conference that resulted in an academic publication on adaptation. The book was SMITH ET AL., CLIMATE
CHANGE, ADAPTIVE CAPACITY AND DEVELOPMENT (2003). The book was strongly influenced by the
concepts developed in the IPCC assessments and was not specific to California.
107. See CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, PIER FIVE-YEAR INVESTMENT PLAN, 2002-2006, (P600-01-004a,
2001), https://perma.cc/C8LV-XNWR.
108. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, 500-03-025FS, CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND
DEMONSTRATION PLAN (2003), https://perma.cc/6D8U-TY2U.
109. ALAN SANSTAD, P500-03-025FAVI, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND
ADAPTATION IN CAL., https://perma.cc/6SAR-5B4L, att'd as Attachment VI to Guido Franco, et al.,
Climate Change Research, Development, and Demonstration Plan, P500-03- 025FS (Apr. 2003), https://
perma.cc/AT7E-L8P2.
110. See, e.g., Karen Fisher-Vanden et al. Modeling Climate Change Feedbacks and Adaptation
Responses: Recent Approaches and Shortcomings, 117 CLIMATIC CHANGE 481, 481-95 (2013); Juan-
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Notwithstanding the lack of progress in adaptation specifically, beginning in
2003 the CEC oversaw a major expansion in climate research. In June 2003, the
CEC created the California Climate Change Center, an online repository for
California's climate research. In 2004, the CEC also began hosting an annual
conference on climate change research. Under the auspices of the Climate
Research Center and the CEC's PIER program, publication levels soared. Six
papers were published in 2004. Forty papers were published in 2005. Thereafter,
the state produced an average of about thirty studies per year, spiking to 62 in
2009, and 73 in 2012, as grant cycles ended. The work was world-class in many
respects and remains an impressive achievement. But in the context of climate
adaptation policy development, it produced little."1
5. Assessment: 1988 to 2005
California's experience between 1988 and 2005 revealed the following poten-
tial barriers to climate adaptation policy development:
" Uncertainty paralysis-treating future uncertainty as an impediment to
analysis, rather than as an analytical input (e.g., CEC 1991)-and endless
investigation-focusing only on trying to resolve uncertainty through
accumulation of additional data, regardless of its information value, with-
out recognizing that certainty may never be achieved (e.g., CEC 1991).
This approach is most like that proposed in AR1 WG3's Resources
Chapter (where uncertainty was treated as a problem to be attacked by
"Category A" interventions, and costly "Category C" options were to be
delayed until Category A's success), and may be distinguished from, for
example, the act-learn-act sequential decisionmaking advocated in AR3
WG2 Report Chapter 2 and later reports.
* Premature combination-attempting to compare mitigation and adaptation
without first ensuring that they are defined in comparable fashion
(e.g., CEC 1991). This is similar to the IPCC's early approaches, which did
not separate mitigation and adaptation until 2001's AR3, and distinguish-
able from later frameworks that focus on adaptation alternatives alone.
* Assessment burnout. In efforts nominally devoted to adaptation, commit-
ting most or all resources to assessment, leaving no time or energy for
addressing questions unique to climate adaptation policy analysis (e.g.,
EPRI 2003). Again, this had analogues in the IPCC's early approaches,
including AR3's primary focus on vulnerability assessment in combina-
tion with a short analysis of adaptation.
Carlos Ciscar & Paul Dowling, Integrated Assessment of Climate Impacts and Adaptation in the Energy
Sector, 46 ENERGY ECON. 531, 531-38 (2014).
111. See Research, CAL-ADAPT, https://perma.cc/J7TW-UHW5 (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
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California's efforts did not treat adaptation as a policy problem conducive to
multi-criteria analysis and consequently did not make major inroads into ques-
tions regarding the effectiveness, efficiency, equity, or feasibility of competing
adaptation options. As discussed below, the trends are recognizable in part
because they continued to manifest.
B. 2005 TO 2015: STRATEGIC PLANS AND FRAGMENTATION
Beginning in 2005, California began dual processes of issuing high-level,
broad, agenda-setting directives and developing strategies and plans consistent
with those directives. For climate adaptation, however, these proved insufficient
to meet the demand for coordination, and over the course of the next decade,
state-level planning processes were barely able to keep up with the proliferation
of adaptation work at local and regional scales. During this period, the
Governor's Office took the lead. This began with Executive Order S-03-05
(2005) and continued with Executive Order S-13-08 (2008), which transformed
the state's adaptation outlook to one of strategic planning. However, the imple-
mentation of this planning was delegated without much direction. State agencies,
coordinated by the California Natural Resources Agency ("CNRA"),1 1 2 were
tasked with completing sectoral climate change impact assessments, which
expanded into collections of recommendations but not a coherent statewide cli-
mate adaptation policy. Meanwhile, local and regional efforts to incorporate ad-
aptation into their planning processes multiplied, and state agencies responded
with guidance.
1. Executive Order S-03-05 (June 2005)
On June 1, 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger issued Executive Order ("E.O.")
S-03-05.13 It is best known for setting California's greenhouse gas emission
reduction targets, which led to the California Legislature's enactment of A.B. 32
the next year." 4 A.B. 32 authorized CARB to create and implement regulations
to meet the state's GHG emissions targets," CARB created a cap-and-trade sys-
tem for statewide GHG emissions, and the state has since invested a great deal of
time, money, and thought into mitigating climate change impacts by improving
its GHG profile. Thus, 2005 marked the beginning of California's world leader-
ship in carbon control policy implementation. This is relevant here, however,
112. The CNRA, created in 1961, is a cabinet-level organization to which most of the state's natural
resources administrations report. Cal. Govt. Code § 12805 (West 2019). The CEC is under CNRA, as is
CAL FIRE and over a dozen other organizations.
113. Cal. Exec. Order No. S-03-05 (Schwarzenegger, June 1, 2005) ("E.O. S-03-05").
114. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat. ch. 488 ("California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006") (adding
Div. 25.5 to the Cal. Health & Safety Code).
115. Id. at pt. 3 (codified Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38550).
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primarily to the extent that mitigation policy overshadowed and largely displaced
adaptation policy development.
With much less fanfare, E.O. S-03-05 also attempted to consolidate the mecha-
nisms by which California state government would prepare for the inevitable
impacts of a changing climate. The E.O. instructed the California Environmental
Protection Agency ("CalEPA")116 to coordinate and report on the state's climate
adaptation plans: "[CalEPA] shall also report to the Governor and the State
Legislature by January 2006 and biannually thereafter on the impacts to
California of global warming, including impacts to water supply, public health,
agriculture, the coastline, and forestry, and shall prepare and report on mitigation
and adaptation plans to combat these impacts."117
Some of the problems with the E.O.'s framing should be evident from the dis-
cussion above: it foregrounded impact assessment (ensuring that the majority of
CalEPA's work would be devoted to that task, potentially to the detriment of ad-
aptation policy) and immediately combined "mitigation and adaptation plans"
into a single category, with the concomitant potential for taxonomic confusion. It
also obscured a hard truth: there were no agreed-upon standards by which adapta-
tion planning could be carried out and no plan for locating leadership responsibil-
ity to create them. E.O. S-03-05 neither directed CalEPA to develop such
standards nor provided any explicit guidance on how to define success, how to
measure cost, what fair solutions would look like, or what kind of solutions had
any political support. Instead, it left this to CalEPA to intuit, in a manner that did
not make it clear that this was now entirely CalEPA's responsibility. Because this
is the first top-level government action on the topic after A.B. 4420 in 1988, and
because it came from the Governor's office (which has a great deal of policymak-
ing capacity and influence), E.O. S-03-05 therefore represents the earliest positive
example of another hallmark of California's climate adaptation policy develop-
ment: failure of leadership to define policy.
2. The Climate Action Team Report (April 2006)
In response to E.O. S-03-05, CalEPA formed the Climate Action Team
("CAT"), formally populated by leaders of state agencies with regulatory portfo-
lios impacted by climate change, functionally operating as a loose inter-agency
coordinating body with research staffing.118 In its first year, the CAT split its
work into two areas: development of market-based options for mitigating
116. CalEPA was created in 1991 following years of debate over and inaction on creating a
consolidated environmental regulatory agency in California. CALEPA, THE HISTORY OF THE
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 19 (2016), https://perma.cc/H8D3-LCCA. It
currently hosts a variety of program-level organizations, including CARB, and the state's pesticide,
recycling, toxics, health hazards, and water resources control agencies.
117. E.O. S-03-05, ¶ 6.
118. CAL. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM ("CAT"), 2006 FINAL CLIMATE ACTION TEAM REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 19 (Apr. 3, 2006), https://perma.cc/54J9-8DFX.
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emissions and scenario analysis to evaluate climate change impacts and adapta-
tion planning.119 Notably, neither of these things were "adaptation plans" as con-
templated (however vaguely) by E.O. S-03-05.
The CAT's first annual report focused on impact assessment and mitigation
and did not make any headway on adaptation. It discussed in general terms the
high level of uncertainty facing adaptation decisionmakers and spoke of adapta-
tion challenges in terms of the need for better information on which to build
plans.1 20 The CAT's scenario analysis work was important and groundbreaking,
and one of its team members wrote a useful paper on climate adaptation barriers
around this time,121 but the CAT's work did not result in a workable statewide ad-
aptation policy development model. The subsequent years, 2006 to 2008, were
extremely important for mitigation policy development. Thus, the CAT shifted
its focus to supporting CARB's creation of the A.B. 32 Scoping Plan. 122 No fur-
ther adaptation policy development occurred until ate 2008.
3. Executive Order S-13-08 (November 2008)
In November 2008, Governor Schwarzenegger issued E.O. S-13-08.123 The
first six sections followed a familiar pattern: state agencies were to consolidate
efforts to predict climate change in the state, assess the impacts to state resources
that climate change could have, and assess the vulnerability of state social and
physical systems to those impacts. But the new E.O. also ordered something new:
By June 30, 2009, [the CNRA], through the [CAT], shall coordinate with local,
regional, state and federal public and private entities to develop a state Climate
Adaptation Strategy. The strategy will summarize the best known science on
climate change impacts to California (led by CEC's PIER program), assess
California's vulnerability to the identified impacts and then outline solutions
that can be implemented within and across state agencies to promote
resiliency. 124
This was the first explicit instruction from a California government authority
directing the identification of policy alternatives for climate adaptation-an
assessment and presentation of "solutions that can be implemented." The new
E.O. also included the first authoritative expression of an explicit criterion for
119. Id.
120. Id. at 37-39.
121. AMY LYND LUERS & SUSANNE C. MOSER, CEC-500-2005-198-SF, PREPARING FOR THE
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN CAL.: ADVANCING THE DEBATE ON ADAPTATION (2005) [hereinafter
Luers & Moser], https://perma.cc/9VH2-DXEZ.
122. CAT, CAT SUBGROUP REPORTS SUPPORTING AB 32 SCOPING PLAN (Dec. 2008) (agriculture,
cement, energy, forestry, green building, waste management, water, and state transportation sectors,
with no discussions of adaptation), https://perma.cc/7LCK-HNP2.
123. Cal. Exec. Order No. S-13-08 (Schwarzenegger, Nov. 14, 2005) [hereinafter E.O. S-13-08].
124. Id. ¶7.
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selecting among such alternatives: "resiliency." The prevailing, research-ori-
ented, integrated assessment paradigm had been quietly abandoned.
However, the new E.O.'s structure was still far from ideal. From an effective-
ness perspective, it did not define its desired outcome: resiliency. It should have
been clear at that point that resiliency was not (and still is not) a clearly defined
concept, and that delegated agencies would struggle without further instruction
regarding what it was supposed to mean, or a formal structure for reaching some
consensus on that question.125 Had it been crafted with effectiveness in mind, the
E.O. might also have taken some position on metrics-meaning how resiliency,
however defined, should be measured for purposes of, for example, cost-
effectiveness analysis. As it was, there was no uniform basis by which to measure
progress or success or to define what constituted a potential "solution," and so no
way to assess how effective (or cost-effective) any given proposal might be.
From an economic impact perspective, the E.O. also did not define how to
measure costs and benefits, rendering uniform cost-benefit analysis impossible.
This was particularly problematic given current events at the time: California was
in the depths of a budgetary crisis during the height of what would be called the
Great Recession.126 Without attention paid to the unmonetizable (or long-term)
upsides of climate adaptation investment, very few available solutions would be
likely to appear economically rational on planning horizons typically employed
by state agencies.
This was probably exacerbated by the second, less obvious criterion: that the
chosen solutions "can be implemented within and across state agencies." One
possible reading of this language-one that ultimately prevailed-is that pro-
posed solutions must be feasible under current governance conditions. Thus,
long-term investment strategies, and all options that cost a great deal of money or
involved changes in prevailing governance structures, were rejected before their
other merits and demerits could be evaluated. What was left was present cost,
meaning immediately available funding, amounting to very little.
Finally, the agency-led drafting strategy-a single state agency would take the
lead on drafting sectoral plans-ensured that plans for how to deal with the physi-
cal transformation of the entire state would not receive public input or be
impacted by political considerations beyond those most salient to the agency
authors. This lack of process equity and procedural legitimacy evidenced a gen-
eral lack of consideration for the equity and public input implications of climate
adaptation at this time. The result was the Climate Change Adaptation Strategy.
125. For a contemporary introduction to this topic, see Carl Folke, Resilience: The Emergence of a
Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems Analyses, 16 GLOB. ENVTL. CHANGE 253 (2006).
126. See generally, Ashok Bardhan & Richard Walker, Cal. Shrugged: Fountainhead of the Great
Recession, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. OF REGIONS, ECON. & SOc'Y 303 (2011).
254 [Vol. 32:227
TOOLS FOR REGULATORS IN A CHANGING CLIMATE
4. The California Climate Adaptation Strategy (December 2009)
The CNRA's response to E.O. S-13-08 highlighted the difficulties of translat-
ing an order to develop a strategic plan through multiple bureaucracies into a sin-
gle strategic, policy, or planning statement. Rather than providing a consistent
vision for the future, identifying alternative actions that could be taken to achieve
that vision, and picking the alternatives most consistent with previously stated,
clearly defined core values (all of which are typical elements of strategic planning
with analogues in multi-criteria policy analysis), the participating agencies
instead produced a list of possibly feasible near-term actions, vaguely specified.
This may have been useful for those involved, but it did not result in a persistent
statewide framework to guide climate adaptation policy development.
The Climate Change Adaptation Strategy ("the CCAS")127 was developed in
the same manner as CEC's 1991 report: by surveying state agency subject matter
experts for adaptation desiderata and attempting to organize these into a logical
structure. The result was less a strategic planning statement han a lengthy to-do
list. The document devoted almost no space to climate adaptation's hard ques-
tions. By this time, these hard questions were public knowledge, as they had been
discussed in depth in AR3. The CCAS did not even mention them.
Regarding effectiveness, having not defined its desired outcomes, the document
was unable to suggest a meaningful approach to determining whether any given al-
ternative would have some desired effect on resiliency or any other metric.
Regarding feasibility and economic impact analysis (efficiency), as public officials
working at the height of a state budget crisis, the authors defaulted to the message
implied by the E.O.: the CCAS would "[g]ive priority to adaptation strategies that
initiate, foster, and enhance existing efforts that improve economic and social
well-being, public safety and security, public health, environmental justice, spe-
cies and habitat protection, and ecological function;" and "[w]hen possible, give
priority to adaptation strategies that modify and enhance existing policies rather
than solutions that require new funding and new staffing." 12 In other words, the
CCAS chose to pursue, at best, the so-called "no regrets" alternatives-those that
are justifiable and feasible under current conditions. Even this characterization
may be generous, however, as the CCAS criteria foreclosed the possibility of any
additional spending, even where it may have been justified under a no-regrets
framework, and failed to discuss how to quantify or monetize the benefits of adap-
tation decisions beyond their up-front costs. The report did this even while recog-
nizing the need to "[f]ormalize criteria for prioritizing identified adaptation
strategies."129
127. CNRA, 2009 CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF
THE STATE OF CAL. IN RESPONSE TO EXECUTIVE ORDER S-13-2008 (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter CCAS],
https://perma.cc/K2H4-2Q96.
128. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 13.
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The bulk of the CCAS was a sector-by-sector discussion of "impacts, risks,
and strategies," with each section led by the state agency with primary sectoral
oversight authority.130 Each sectoral impact assessment ended with a nested list
of proposed actions, divided into general "strategy" categories and labeled as
near-term or long-term.131 There was no evidence of effort to identify the goals
that the proposals were designed to achieve; no discussion of the range of alterna-
tives that could also have been considered before the chosen strategies would be
adopted; no attempt to agree upon criteria by which alternatives could be eval-
uated; and no attempt to apply such criteria to confirm that the proposed strategies
actually would be effective at achieving these goals, to assess the cost and cost
per unit outcome of each strategy, or to grapple with equity. Rather, the solutions
appear to be what each agency (apparently) believed were financially and politi-
cally feasible.
No doubt, many of the suggestions in the CCAS were good. For example, con-
sistent with the long-recognized need to inject climate adaptation into planning
processes, the CCAS supported revising the California Environmental Quality
Act13 2 to require discussion of potential impacts from climate change, although it
did not suggest how the analysis should be done or how to deal with uncertainty.
The criticism here is toward the process that resulted in only including these pro-
posals (not the full range of other proposals) in the document, without the alterna-
tives selection process being explained, explicit, or carefully reviewed.
Beyond the individual agency contributions, the CCAS did present several
statewide strategies that have been influential in developing further policy. First,
the CCAS recommended a California Climate Vulnerability Assessment, which
it hoped would "allow policy-makers the ability to develop a more systematic
approach to funding risk reduction efforts."13 3 This reflected the growing consen-
sus that the primary expression of equity analysis would be via vulnerability
assessment. This was consistent with international practice at this time (vulner-
ability had been the foundation of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change equity approach), although by 2009 it had become apparent that
vulnerability itself was a difficult standard to employ.134 By directing the majority
of the state's climate adaptation resources toward vulnerability assessment, the
CCAS created the risk of endless investigation to more carefully define a funda-
mentally vague metric, particularly in the event of allocation conflict where vul-
nerability will be used to decide whether groups received money.
130. For example, the forestry section was written by CAL FIRE staff. See id. at 1, 4 (chapters "led
by" competent agencies).
131. Id. at40-44, 57-64, 73-78, 86-91, 100-06, 116-21, 130-34.
132. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21000 et seq.
133. CCAS, supra note 127, at 28.
134. For a contemporary discussion of the vulnerability concept, see Stephen H. Schneider et al.,
Assessing Key Vulnerabilities and the Risk from Climate Change, in AR4 WG2 REPORT, supra note 67,
at 779-810.
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Next, the CCAS recommended continued investment in CalAdapt, a statewide
climate vulnerability data mapping system that would "allow[] local communities
to develop their own climate adaptation strategies based on this information."135
Although this also sought to address equity, the difficulty with the CalAdapt pro-
gram was, and continues to be, that to provide information that is useful, it is nec-
essary to know what the goals are. CalAdapt's purpose of letting local
communities "develop their own . .. strategies" replaced statewide policy leader-
ship with a website.
The leadership failure problem, then, was again at the core of the CCAS-and
appears to have been obliquely recognized by the authors, who highlighted the
need for a unified effort to set policy and admitted that they had not done so them-
selves. To address the lack of clear answers to many of the questions that a strate-
gic plan is typically supposed to answer, the CCAS recommended creating a
Climate Adaptation Advisory Panel to continue developing a strategic vision.136
The results were the CCAAP/PCIP.
5. The CCAAP/PCIP Strategy (November 2010)
By 2009, the lead agency on climate adaptation had shifted several times.
Between 1988 and 2005, the CEC took the reins with a research focus. In 2005,
the governor's office took over leadership and imposed a more strategic focus
while making several attempts to consolidate and unify adaptation policymaking.
The CAT did not achieve this goal, and with E.O. S-13-08, the torch passed to
CNRA. CNRA, however, recommended creating an advisory panel to oversee
and develop a strategic vision. For a brief period, that job was given to a policy
firm.
In early 2009, the Pacific Council on International Policy ("PCIP") organized a
Task Force on Adaptation to Climate Change. 1 7 Following the publication of the
CCAS, Governor Schwarzenegger named the PCIP's Task Force to serve as the
Climate Adaptation Advisory Panel. The panel's work resulted in a single report,
remarkable for its policy-oriented approach.138
PCIP's report set out a new vision: "to encourage that all major planning and
development decisions throughout the State be made within a coherent,
135. CCAS, supra note 127, at 28.
136. Id. at 7, 22, 26, 146-47.
137. See Pacific Council Task Force to Advise State on Climate Adaptation, BUSINESS WIRE (Dec. 8,
2009) (the description of the Task Force's work at that time is consistent with the layout of their final
report), https://perma.cc/SN9X-V5H7. It is not clear to what extent CNRA's recommendation for an
advisory panel was made with the intent that the PCIP Task Force serve in that role, or to which the
PCIP's creation of the Task Force was with the purpose of taking on more official advisory
responsibilities.
138. PAC. COUNCIL ON INTL. POL'Y, PREPARING FOR THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE - A
STRATEGY FOR CALIFORNIA: A REPORT BY THE CALIFORNIA ADAPTATION ADVISORY PANEL OF THE
STATE OF CAL. (2010), https://perma.cc/BRN2-7SR8. After the report came out, the PCIP moved on to
other things.
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comprehensive framework to guide adaptation," based on values, including that
the approaches be "science and analysis-based, collaboratively developed, and
financially viable," and providing a "long-term approach to adaptation to guide
decision-making at all levels."139 PCIP was concerned with legitimacy through
stakeholder participation, public engagement, and comment,140 and it recognized
the importance of clearly delegated decisionmaking authority.14 1 This was the
first time that these ideas had been discussed in state-level climate adaptation pol-
icy documents.
The PCIP report also reflected an understanding of the policy analysis and de-
velopment process. For example, the PCIP recommended anticipatory data gath-
ering and the creation of a central repository under unitary authority as an
element of its problem identification strategy.14 2 Prior data gathering proposals
had been framed in terms of needing additional data because uncertainty was a
problem; in contrast, the PCIP proposed limited, rational anticipatory data gather-
ing because it recognized that certain data would be useful to help define the
problems that needed to be solved.143 This data gathering would not simply result
in more data gathering, it would result in problem definitions which, in turn,
would help agencies identify alternative solutions.144
Likewise, with respect to assessment, he PCIP recommended the creation of
"a credible, authoritative, and scientific professional entity to assess climate risks
to the built and natural environments throughout the state,"145 which would de-
velop and maintain protocols for state and local entities to follow when conduct-
ing climate risk assessments, risk characterization, and adaptation alternatives
identification evaluation. The PCIP, it seems, recognized that it was not such an
entity, even though it had been given a similar job.
Regarding integration into planning processes, PCIP recommended incorporat-
ing climate change analysis into "all long-term general planning and public and
private sector development proposals,"146 with a focus on integrating the many
regional and local planning initiatives that were then beginning to proliferate.
Again, this proposal can be contrasted to the CCAS's strategy, which referred
local agencies to public resources made available on CalAdapt. The suggestion to
integrate climate adaptation into planning was made in combination with the sug-
gestion that some authority centrally guide the process.
139. Id. at 1.
140. Id. at 2.
141. Id. ("Lead agencies are needed at every level of government to reconcile competing interests,
forge compromises, expedite decisions onadaptation, and overcome barriers to action.").
142. Id. at 4-5.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 5.
146. PAC. COUNCIL ON INTL. POL'Y, supra note 138, at 8.
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And finally, regarding funding, the report recommended "that the state launch
a feasibility study to explore mechanisms to fund adaptation and encourage resil-
ient actions,""' particularly to build funds for large-scale public works and to
revise private property insurance standards to incentivize resiliency. These ideas
were available in the IPCC assessment reports and can be contrasted to the
CCAS's limitations to current spending and existing programs.
The PCIP did not attempt to answer the many criteria-level questions that pol-
icy development would have to resolve. Instead, it made recommendations
that would create the conditions of possibility for such resolutions. It had its
drawbacks-it was short, provided few references, and did not fully explain the
basis of some of its assumptions and perspectives. But when compared against
policy analytical ideals, it exceeded all other efforts. It was entirely ignored.
6. The Adaptation Planning Guide (Sept. 2012) and Other Guidance (2010 to
2015)
During the next five years, the demand for unified climate adaptation guidance
only grew. California government is not just a state-level affair. Local and re-
gional organizations pursue independent objectives and interface with state
bodies in a complex project of federalist co-governance. The years between 2010
and 2015 saw a number of guidance documents issued by state agencies to sup-
port local planning efforts.148 None of these was prepared under a unified frame-
work for assessing alternatives.
The most significant guidance effort during this period was the Adaptation
Planning Guide ("APG") by the Governor's Office of Planning and Research
("OPR").149 The APG was significant in part because it developed the OPR's ad-
aptation policymaking capacity, but also because it demonstrated the degree to
which local and regional organizations had stepped into the breach left by the
state government. It was primarily descriptive, rather than prescriptive, providing
suggestions based on what other jurisdictions in the state had already done.
Rather than suggest that cities draft a climate change plan, the APG provided a
link to the City of Chula Vista's. Rather than suggest outreach programs, the
APG provided a link to an example by the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
147. Id. at 10.
148. See, e.g., CAL. DEP'T OF FISH & GAME, UNITY, INTEGRATION, AND ACTION: DFG's VIsION FOR
CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA (2011), https://perma.cc/KR2Q-Q9VD; CAL. DEP'T OF
WATER RES. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Climate Change Handbook for Regional Water Planning
(2011), https://perma.cc/THE9-A9QV; COASTAL & OCEAN WORKING GRP. OF THE CAL. CLIMATE
ACTION TEAM & CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA SEA-LEVEL RISE GUIDANCE:
MARCH 2013 UPDATE, https://perma.cc/2DB6-8UMP; CAL. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, CLIMATE ACTION
FOR HEALTH: INTEGRATING HEALTH INTO CLIMATE ACTION PLANNING (2012), https://perma.cc/E3PK-
C77X; PUB. HEALTH WORKING GRP. OF THE CAL. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, PREPARING FOR EXTREME
HEAT IN CALIFORNIA: GUIDANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2013), https://perma.cc/WGB9-F896.
149. CAL. GOV.'S OFF. OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA ADAPTATION PLANNING GUIDE
(2012) [hereinafter APG].
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Development Commission. The APG, then, performed a useful function but did
not provide a great deal of leadership. Instead, responsibility devolved down-
ward, with efforts duplicated across local authorities. This continued for several
more years.
7. The Little Hoover Commission Report (July 2014)
California maintains an independent government review commission called
the Milton Marks "Little Hoover" Commission on California State Government
Organization and Economy (the "LHC").15 0 In early 2013, the LHC decided to
study climate adaptation for the first time. It conducted three public hearings and
seventy expert interviews and convened an advisory Commission that published
its report the following July."1
The LHC's primary findings were consistent with the above analysis. There
was a documented lack of state-level leadership, processes largely conducted
without public input, and failure to produce information that was usable or useful
to those who needed it. The LHC Report documented criticisms of the recently-
completed CCAS in particular: it was not developed with input outside of the
state agencies that wrote it, and it was entirely non-binding and thus "likely to go
largely unread and unheeded." 1 2 The LHC also criticized the CAT as insular and
out of touch.153 It commented more favorably on the many agency initiatives to
incorporate climate adaptation into their processes and the proliferation of re-
gional and local planning initiatives, particularly among the large metropolitan
areas, but it recognized that these were proceeding without coordination and with
a potentially large duplication of efforts."1 4 The Commission summarized its
findings:
While state and local governments study what might happen on the ground in
California as a result of climate change, other fundamental questions also call
for attention: How will the state most effectively govern during possible sus-
tained periods of trial, disruption or emergency? What governing and adminis-
trative structures will best provide comprehensive regional or statewide
solutions and minimize poorly-considered and wasteful community-by-
community fixes? How might elected officials best budget today's tax dollars
150. The unusual name is a reference to the 1947 and 1953 "Hoover Commissions" on federal
government organization, both chaired by then-former President Hoover. Milton Marks was a California
legislator. Milton Marks; Career S.F. Legislator, L.A. TIMEs (Dec. 5, 1998), https://perma.cc/9BMG-
BL6P.
151. CAL. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, GOVERNING CALIFORNIA THROUGH CLIMATE CHANGE (July
2014), https://perna.cc/QTW4-BVFU.
152. Id. at 17.
153. Id. at 19 ("The [LHC] heard more criticisms from outsiders in local government and the private
sector that he Climate Action Team process, too, tends to be insular with state officials talking mostly
with their peers in other state agencies. The Climate Action Team, like the official adaptation strategy
process, could benefit from obtaining more perspective outside the state government purview.").
154. Id. at 19-20.
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to prepare the state for tomorrow's uncertainty? What kind of land use deci-
sions are most appropriate when long-held assumptions of predictable, stable
geography in which to live, work and build permanent buildings are no longer
relevant? The Commission's study process portrayed a state still seeking the
answers. There is not much of a game plan beyond a growing stack of studies
and plans.5
The LHC was particularly concerned that this situation did not compare favor-
ably to California's successful actions on emissions mitigation policy develop-
ment, which could rely on clear effectiveness metrics. In the LHC's words: "No
one has proposed reducing California acreage burned by wildfires to 1990 levels
by 2020. There is no global target to make coastal development withstand six feet
of sea level rise by 2100."156 Lacking centralized standards, local and regional
entities were left "scrambling" for their own answers."1 5
In its discussion of governance challenges, the LHC identified several common
problems that, in its judgment, were impeding progress. First, it noted that deci-
sionmakers "lack common adaptation standards," as evidenced for example by
the construction of the new Bay Bridge without accounting for sea level rise,
while development on Treasure Island (through which the Bay Bridge transits)
has been planned to withstand 55 inches of sea level rise. "Such inconsistency,
multiplied countless times across the state, reveals potential for disarray if differ-
ent layers of government continue to make land use and infrastructure decisions
in the absence of a larger governing framework for climate change adaptation. "158
The LHC also noted that current governance systems were built on the same lim-
ited heuristics that make climate change difficult for individuals to grapple with:
current processes assume "stationarity" (being able to rely on the world being the
way it always has been); the inability to sacrifice in the present for the benefit of
the future; and the inability to measure progress on long timescales.159 These
unique challenges, combined with everyday institutional barriers (lack of fund-
ing, lack of knowledge, jurisdictional conflict, etc.) had stymied all progress.
To address these challenges, the LHC took the very unusual (and politically
challenging) step of proposing a new state authority.160 The LHC imagined the
agency as a unified authority to help other agencies decide which data to use and
how to integrate climate into their disparate planning processes. It would, in other
155. Id. at iv.
156. Id. at 44.
157. Id. at vi ("Such questions in the absence of mutually-agreed upon solutions and risk assessment
protocols from the state have sent regions scrambling to assemble their own understanding of local
impacts and possible solutions.").
158. Id. at 41.
159. Id. at 42-43.
160. Id. at 46-66. The LHC was very clear that it did not see this organization as a policymaking
body (devoting a short section titled "Not a Policymaking Body" to allaying fears of state overtake of
local land use control). Id. at 57.
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words, help local authorities ensure that they were using the best available infor-
mation and risk assessment tools and practices. "Over the long run, the standards
[developed by this authority], updated as needed to reflect emerging climate con-
ditions, would gradually, thoroughly embed themselves into state and local plan-
ning and development processes."161 What the LHC's proposal failed to address,
however, was that it is not possible simply to provide tools and information with-
out some prior decision regarding the manner in which those tools and informa-
tion can be, or should be, used.
Overall, the LHC report was a perceptive and useful description of the dys-
functional state of climate adaptation policy development in California as of
2014. Its proposals, influenced by experts in policy development and governance,
were designed to garner support and move the state's efforts forward. They were,
however, purely advisory, and the inertia of existing processes would exert more
influence.
8. Safeguarding California (July 2014)
In 2009, E.O. S-13-08 had ordered the CNRA to take the lead on climate adap-
tation policy development. CNRA had responded by collecting together policy
proposals, sourced entirely from California state government agency specialists.
By 2013, CNRA had determined that it should update the CCAS. This resulted in
a series of public meetings between July 2013 and January 2014. Once again,
CNRA oversaw sector-specific and cross-sectoral working groups to handle the
work. The result was "Safeguarding California." 162
Safeguarding California remains California's "official" climate adaptation pol-
icy statement. It was quickly amended with a series of sectoral implementation
plans and was recently updated, as discussed below. The 2014 document recom-
mended that the state "[e]stablish a mandate . . . for all state agencies to consider
climate risks in their policies, planning efforts, and investments."163 This recom-
mendation was weakened by the fact that the plan did not take any position on
how agencies were supposed to consider climate risks. Rather, it proposed that
some authority promulgate "guidelines for state agencies to follow as they incor-
porate climate considerations" into their planning processes.164 It recommended
that any guidance "develop metrics and indicators to track progress on efforts to
reduce climate risk." 165
161. Id. at 57.
162. CNRA, SAFEGUARDING CALIFORNIA: REDUCING CLIMATE RISK: AN UPDATE TO THE 2009
CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY (July 2014), http://resources.ca.gov/docs/climate/
Final_Safeguarding_CA_Plan_July_31_2014.pdf [hereinafter SAFEGUARDING CALIFORNIA].
163. Id. at 10.
164. Id. at 11.
165. Id. at 13.
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As had previous state efforts, Safeguarding California recommended that the
state "[p]rovide data, tools, and guidance to support efforts to reduce climate
risks." 166 But the real problem had not been a lack of information-it was that
there was far too much information, and not enough effort to make it useful. So,
for example, Safeguarding California recommended numerous additional vulner-
ability assessments,167 but without a clear purpose. Similarly, it promoted main-
taining and expanding environmental monitoring systems.168 However, there was
no effort to determine in each case whether additional data would actually change
outcomes if it were collected, or otherwise be useful. Overall, the 2014 iteration
of Safeguarding California did little to overcome any of the barriers that had
slowed California's climate adaptation policy development o that point.
9. Assessment: 2005 to 2015
The state's climate adaptation policy between 2005 and 2015 was to encourage
development of sector-specific (e.g., agricultural, energy) and jurisdiction-spe-
cific (e.g., local, regional transportation sector, etc.) action plans, without strong
centralized coordination. The state government's role was confined to coordinat-
ing intermittent lists of items being discussed, and, sporadically, tracking pro-
gress on proposed actions. The state collected the lists and made efforts to extract
cross-sectoral proposals from the collections, which were, typically, ignored. The
state's stated policy was to produce plans-but nothing it did, upon scrutiny,
looked like planning. The state received recommendations from two independent
review authorities-PCIP and the LHC-but these could not immediately over-
come the inertia of work set in motion by E.O. S-03-05 and E.O. S-13-08. The
preceding history revealed the following significant barriers to climate adaptation
policy development in California:
* Leadership failure. Entities with the authority to set statewide policy
resulting from a difficult but necessary value-balancing process-particu-
larly the Governor's office and Legislature-did not do so, and instead
delegated policy development work to subsidiary organizations that were
not capable of doing so (E.O. S-03-05, CCAS, E.O. S-13-08, legislative
silence).
* Undefined criteria. Decisionmakers failed to rigorously consider the deci-
sion criteria they were using to develop policy. After another decade of
work, it was not clear even what adaptation meant in various contexts, or
how to measure it. Prevailing decisionmaking defaults pushed alternative
selection toward low- or no-cost options regardless of effectiveness or
need (E.O. S-13-08).
166. Id. at 259.
167. Id. at 183-85.
168. Id. at 185-86.
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* Lack of public participation. Policy development was conducted by execu-
tive agencies not capable of embodying the full range of stakeholder inter-
ests and viewpoints (CCAS, as discussed in LHC Report; Safeguarding
California).
* Laundry listing. Instructed to develop statewide strategic plans, individual
agencies listed what they were doing, or wanted to do, and efforts were
made ex ante to structure these recommendations into some sort of appa-
rent strategy. (CCAS, Safeguarding California).
* Information overload. While a great deal of effort had gone into producing
information, much less was undertaken to ensure the information provided
was useful (CCAS, CalAdapt, APG and other guidance).
* Duplicating work. Resources were wasted by entities that felt the need to
develop plans but had no guidance on how to do so. State authorities strug-
gled to develop guidance but faced challenges owing to the leadership vac-
uum (APG and other guidance).
* Mistrust regarding land-use control. Proposals for statewide standard-set-
ting authorities were not implemented. It is possible that one reason for
this (apparently present behind the LHC report) was that climate adapta-
tion policy includes land use control, and local authorities do not wish to
cede traditional powers to state decisionmakers.
* Limited heuristics. As recognized by the LHC, climate change adaptation
tests the limits of human decisionmaking capacity. To the extent that here is a
signal of long-term danger, it is lost among crises of more near-term concern.
* Everyday barriers. Also as recognized by the LHC, climate change adapta-
tion suffers from the same challenges that plague most public administra-
tion. Lack of funding, a lack of expertise, jurisdictional disputes, and other
quotidian management issues combine with the challenges discussed above.
* The false choice. Although never discussed above, another notable aspect
of the above history is the lack of participation by civil society. Had envi-
ronmentally-oriented non-governmental organizations wished to make cli-
mate adaptation a priority, it is likely that state climate adaptation policy
development would have gone very differently. However, the perception
among environmental policy leaders had been that focusing on adaptation
would undercut mitigation efforts. Thus, there was a lack of concerted
effort by non-governmental advocacy organizations to focus the govern-
ment on these problems.169
Fundamentally, as examined by both the PPIC and LHC Reports, the state had
failed to examine climate change adaptation as a policy problem. Lacking the po-
litical coordination to define a clear vision or measurable goals, the state could
make no progress on developing effective strategies for achieving those goals.
Without a serious effort to quantify and monetize risks of inaction and the (finan-
cial or non-financial) benefits of action, and often considering only immediate
169. See LUERS & MOSER, supra note 121, at 1-3.
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costs, the state could make no progress on developing efficient approaches, partic-
ularly as examined over a long term. Having not been empowered with a broad
mandate to resolve problems,feasibility became understood primarily in terms of
present cost in a constrained budgetary environment and resulted in a total lack of
action. Ultimately, then, the state could do nothing to address the increasingly se-
rious equity implications of climate change.
As of 2015, then, California still did not really have a climate adaptation pol-
icy. It would next turn its attention to integrating climate adaptation into the
state's many decision processes.
C. 2015 TO 2018: STEPS TOWARD INTEGRATION
The years 2015 to 2018 saw a spike in interest in climate adaptation policy de-
velopment in California. These efforts were hindered, however, by the shortcom-
ings described above. The primary development was an effort to begin to
integrate climate adaptation into all state decisionmaking processes. This has
remained difficult, however, as there is a difference between ordering that inte-
gration occur and deciding how it should occur. The Legislature has addressed
this need in limited circumstances, and state planning documents seem, slowly, to
be trending toward better models. But it remains to be seen if these efforts will
succeed.
1. Executive Order B-30-15 (April 2015): Mandating Integration
On April 29, 2015, Governor Brown issued E.O. B-30-15.170 The new order
was directly influenced by the suggestions in both Safeguarding California nd
the LHC Report, although there were significant differences between what was
suggested and what was done.
First, E.O. B-30-15 required all state agencies to "take climate change into
account in their planning and investment decisions and employ full life-cycle
cost accounting to evaluate and compare infrastructure investments and alterna-
tives."171 In other words, following the growing consensus that this must occur,
the Governor issued a mandate that would, from this point forward, require state
planning processes to incorporate climate change considerations.
Second, the new E.O. moved forward with the LHC Report's suggestion that
some authority take the lead on helping state agencies comply with the first
requirement. The authority was kept within the Governor's office, at OPR, which
was required to establish a "technical, advisory group to help state agencies incor-
porate climate change impacts into planning and investment decisions."12 The
E.O. specified that these decisions were to be guided by four principles: priority
170. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-30-15 (Brown, Apr. 29, 2015) ("E.O. B-30-15").
171. Id. § 6.
172. Id. § 9.
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is given to actions that "both build climate preparedness and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions;" are "flexible and adaptive ... to prepare for uncertain climate
impacts;" "protect the state's most vulnerable populations;" and prioritize "natu-
ral infrastructure solutions."1 3
As with prior directives, the new order continued to defer the problem of decid-
ing which standards are supposed to govern, with OPR now in charge of estab-
lishing another advisory committee, and agencies required to incorporate
adaptation into their processes without being told how that should be done.
However, the E.O.'s additional criteria do finally recognize, though not com-
pletely address, several key policy analytical issues. By stating that state action
should "protect the state's most vulnerable populations,"14 the state explicitly
recognized the potential equity implications of climate adaptation planning,
although not in the context of unequal costs of risk-bearing. By prioritizing
actions that serve both mitigation and adaptation purposes, the order highlights
the need for economic efficiency where possible, while recognizing that these
cannot always be combined. By highlighting flexibility, the state has, for the first
time, stated a preference for an approach that could entail a more formally itera-
tive, act-learn-act process that incorporates risk and uncertainty ranges, although
again this is not specified. All of these are positive developments, but success will
depend on how these instructions are implemented.
2. California Senate EQC Hearings (Feb. to Nov. 2015)
From February to October 2015, the California Senate Environmental Quality
Committee ("EQC") conducted a series of hearings on the status of the state's cli-
mate adaptation governance. These hearings were conducted simultaneously
with the Legislature's consideration of several bills, discussed in the following
sections. Although presented in seriatim here, the bills and hearings developed
simultaneously and in tandem.175
The Senate background documentation described the highly fragmented state
of adaptation planning, noting trends in climate adaptation plans, the LHC
Report's conclusion that there was a "need for a more unified approach to adapta-
tion on the part of state government," and the largely advisory nature of most
guidance. The hearings began from the idea that "aggressive adaptation and resil-
iency building policies must be holistically incorporated into the state's overarch-
ing climate strategy to create a more comprehensive approach to addressing
climate change." The EQC hearings coincided with the introduction and passage
of three bills: S.B. 246 (centralizing adaptation policy in the OPR); A.B. 1482
173. Id. § 7.
174. Id.
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(mandating rolling reviews), and S.B. 379 (integrating adaptation into local plan-
ning), each discussed below. 176
3. S.B. 246 (Oct. 8, 2015): OPR Coordination
S.B. 246 (2015)177 attempted to address the fragmentation problem that had
been a hallmark of California's adaptation policy development, a need identified
by the LHC report and Senate EQC hearings. Its author intended to consolidate
state climate adaptation planning efforts under a single coordinating authority via
what the bill called the Integrated Climate Adaptation and Resiliency Program
("ICARP"). The original bill sought to locate this authority in the still-extant, if
largely dormant, Climate Action Team. Later amendments, consistent with the
decision that had just been made in E.O. B-30-15, switched these responsibilities
to OPR.178 In its final form, S.B. 246 required the OPR to "coordinate regional
and local efforts with state climate adaptation strategies to adapt to the impacts of
climate change with, to the extent feasible, an emphasis on climate equity consid-
erations across sectors and regions and strategies that benefit both greenhouse gas
emissions reductions and adaptation efforts."179 The OPR would develop "tools
and guidance" for local and regional use and promote coordination between state
agencies and local and regional authorities.
Beyond this general mission, OPR's immediate tasks were to create and main-
tain an online clearinghouse for climate adaptation information, to assist CalEPA
to update the APG, and to work with a new advisory council on adaptation.180 As
of this writing, OPR had organized the ICARP Technical Advisory Council
("TAC"), which began conducting regular meetings in March 2017.181 The
TAC's statement of vision and principles contains a number of familiar elements:
vulnerability as a resource allocation rule (a footnote states that he workgroup is
working to define vulnerability, indicating again that this work requires a lot of
additional effort), promoting resilience, promoting actions that reduce GHG
emissions and build resilience simultaneously, stating equity as a criterion
(implemented primarily via participation), prioritizing green infrastructure solu-
tions, employing adaptive and flexible governance, and avoiding maladaptation.
176. Prior to E.O. B-30-15, the only further Legislative statement was A.B. 2516, 2014 Cal. Stat. Ch.
522, https://perma.cc/9WNP-5AUP. This bill created the California Planning for Sea Level Rise
Database, managed by the CNRA and populated with contributions from various state agencies. This
resulted in a biannual review by the OPR and final compilation of a single spreadsheet, posted online at
https://perma.cc/BC4J-25HD. It was only authorized through 2018, and the resulting spreadsheet does
not appear to be very useful.
177. S.B. 246, 2015 Cal. Stat. Ch. 606, https://perma.cc/TDQ9-RFH7.
178. See comparison of bills as introduced and chaptered, https://perma.cc/3RMQ-6V8L.
179. S.B. 246 (2015), § 1, codified Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 71354.
180. Id., codified Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 71360.
181. See Technical Advisory Council, CAL. GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, https://
perma.cc/X9WJ-LESU (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
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OPR has also made progress on the online clearinghouse.18 2
4. A.B. 1482 (Oct. 8, 2015): Rolling Reviews
A.B. 1482 (2015)183 codified and amended parts of E.O. B-30-15. It required
the CNRA to update Safeguarding California every three years beginning in
January 2017.184 It also codified the plan's existing structure: sectoral vulnerabil-
ity assessment and identification of "priority actions needed to reduce risks in
those sectors."185 The CNRA would be required to report to the legislature each
year regarding progress on implementing actions identified in the plan.186
Meanwhile, the Strategic Growth Council received direction in its award of
Sustainable Communities development funds, including particularly reviewing
the Five-Year Infrastructure Plan and the State Environmental Goals and Policy
Report.187
The bill also put forth a number of "objectives" that state agencies were
required to incorporate ("where applicable and feasible") into their attempts to
"address the vulnerabilities identified in the plan:" facilitate public education;
maintain a scientific data repository; use the plan to inform planning decisions
and state investments; promote natural-feature adaptation alternatives; encourage
regional adaptation planning; promote drought resiliency; develop urban green-
ing projects; protect species habitat; and promote healthy soils, transportation
planning, emergency management, safe energy, health threat response capacity,
disadvantaged communities, and cultural resources.188 It is not yet clear how all
of these requirements will be integrated into all of the relevant planning
processes.
5. S.B. 379 (Oct. 8, 2015): Local Adaptation Plans
S.B. 379 (2015)189 required the integration of climate adaptation and resiliency
principles into the safety element of municipal comprehensive plans. The new
requirements include a climate vulnerability assessment; a set of adaptation and
resilience goals, policies, and objectives; and a set of implementation measures
designed to carry out those goals.190 Again, it is not yet clear exactly how well
these new plans are progressing.
182. See RESILIENTCA.ORG, https://perma.cc/H8VB-9UNS (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
183. A.B. 1482, 2015 Cal. Stat. Ch. 603, https://perma.cc/5L7A-R3CN.
184. Id. § 2 (codified at Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 71153).
185. Id. (codified at Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 71153).
186. Id. (codified at Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 71153(2)(c)).
187. Id. (codified at Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 75125).
188. Id. (codified at Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 71154).
189. S.B. 379, 2015 Cal. Stat. 2015 Ch. 608, https://perma.cc/VT7L-R33Q.
190. Id. § 1 (codified at Cal. Govt. Code § 65302(g)(4)).
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6. A.B. 2800 (Sept. 24, 2016): the CSIWG
A.B. 2800 (2016)191 recognized that climate change impacts must be accounted
for in the engineering and design processes for major infrastructure in California.
It requires all state agencies to "take into account the current and future impacts
of climate change when planning, designing, building, operating, maintaining
and investing in state infrastructure."1 92 The law also created a Climate-Safe
Infrastructure Working Group ("CSIWG"), which would examine how to inte-
grate scientific data into state infrastructure. It would, among other things, assess
the informational and institutional barriers to integrating projected climate
change impacts into infrastructure design, identify critical information needed for
engineers responsible for infrastructure design and construction, and make rec-
ommendations to the legislature. The CSIWG began meeting in January 2018193
and published a report in September of that year.194
7. A.B. 398 (July 7, 2017): Cap-and-Trade Funds
Finally, although not specifically a climate adaptation bill, A.B. 398 (2017)195
added "climate adaptation and resiliency" projects to the list of works eligible to
receive funds generated by the state's cap-and-trade program, which the bill also
extended. To the extent that funding has been a barrier to implementation of cli-
mate adaptation policy, this may provide resources.
8. Assessment: 2015 to 2018
Starting in 2015, the "lead agency" on climate adaptation appears to have
shifted once again, from CNRA (still responsible for coordinating Safeguarding
California) to the Governor's OPR, with significant contributions by way of bind-
ing directives from the California Legislature. Both the Governor's Office and
the Legislature have prioritized climate adaptation and have provided a series of
new directives about priorities.
The primary outstanding problem appears to be a lack of specificity regarding
the resolution of the many policy-analytical problems that the state must still,
eventually, confront if it is to truly make progress on climate change adaptation.
As currently framed, these problems will most likely become expressed as a se-
ries of decisions about how to integrate climate change into decisionmaking.
191. A.B. 2800, 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 580, https://perma.cc/AU4W-ZLUR.
192. Id. § 2 (codified at Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 71155).
193. See CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, PAYING IT FORWARD: THE PATH TOWARD CLIMATE-SAFE
INFRASTRUCTURE IN CALIFORNIA, https://perma.cc/XBE7-US5M.
194. CSIWG, PAYING IT FORWARD: THE PATH TOWARD CLIMATE-SAFE INFRASTRUCTURE IN
CALIFORNIA - A REPORT OF THE CLIMATE-SAFE INFRASTRUCTURE WORKING GROUP TO THE CALIFORNIA
STATE LEGISLATURE AND THE STRATEGIC GROWTH COUNCIL (2018), http://resources.ca.gov/docs/
climate/ab2800/AB2800_Climate-Safelnfrastructure_FinalWithAppendices.pdf.
195. A.B. 398, 2017 Cal. Stat. Ch. 135, https://perma.cc/MA5M-3PLU.
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There is still a great deal of room for interpretation, wasted effort, and avoidance
of the hard questions, which risks maintaining a fragmented and internally incon-
sistent statewide regulatory patchwork until further guidance is provided. It is
likely that this will have to be confronted sector-by-sector, and even process-by-
process, for the time being.
Whether officially or not, California appears to be committed to this bottom-up
policy development strategy. The state leaves it to agency experts and technical
workgroups to recognize that planning for climate adaptation requires metrics for
measuring success (effectiveness), choices about present versus future costs (effi-
ciency), risk allocation (equity), and, potentially, significant shifts in control over
land use (feasibility), among many other difficult and politically controversial
matters. With little policy guidance, each organization responsible for protecting
the health and safety of the people of California will be required to confront the
difficult task of deciding how best to integrate climate change into heir existing
decisionmaking structures and authorities.
The question then becomes: can they do it?
III. ASSESSING CALIFORNIA'S REGULATORY INTEGRATION-EXAMPLES FROM THE
ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR
This Part examines whether and to what extent four Californian electric regula-
tory processes have integrated climate change adaptation considerations and
incorporated climate-relevant data. Each analysis is based on a review of com-
plete regulatory dockets to determine the data sources and methods used by
decisionmakers. The reviews were limited to publicly available records to simul-
taneously assess the xtent to which the public and other outside stakeholders
could have contributed.
Prior to the case studies, Section A briefly returns to the documents discussed
in Parts I and II, but with a focus entirely on the electricity sector. From A.B.
4420, in 1988, to IPCC's AR5 and beyond, researchers and policymakers have
recognized that the electric grid will need to adapt to climate change. The review
confirms that these specific studies have been no more successful at answering
how this ought to be done than the more general planning efforts.
Sections B through E cover the four regulatory case studies. Section B explores
the long-term electric grid reliability planning process-the effort to model future
electricity supply, demand, and transmission in order to ensure that the future
grid will be able to function without widespread blackouts or massively spiking
electricity costs. This process involves numerous planning authorities-from
standards developed by the National Electric Reliability Corporation ("NERC"),
to regional studies conducted according to those standards by the Western
Electricity Coordinating Council's ("WECC"), to the statewide study conducted
by the California Independent System Operator (the "CAISO"), using data inputs
from the CEC and the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC").
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Variations in temperature and precipitation trends are especially relevant o this
planning work.
Section C examines a fire threat mapping proceeding conducted by the CPUC,
using inputs from the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
("CAL FIRE"). The goal of this work is to produce a single map that electric util-
ities are able to use to plan their vegetation management activities (stricter stand-
ards in areas with higher fire risks). Variation in temperatures, wind speeds,
precipitation, and vegetation cover are all relevant to this proceeding.
Section D reviews two recent hermal generator siting reviews conducted by
the CEC and CPUC in coordination with the California Coastal Commission
("CCC"). The reviews are conducted prior to the construction or relicensing of
large thermal generators,196 and the two facilities reviewed were each proposed to
be built on the coast (a plentiful source of cooling water), where long-term varia-
tions in mean sea level are particularly relevant.
Section E covers a recent effort at the CPUC to introduce risk assessment into
its general rate cases.197 Specifically, it reviews the initial effort by one of
California's largest electric utilities-Pacific Gas & Electric ("PG&E")-to cre-
ate a model that would adjust financial risks faced by the company after incorpo-
rating changing climatic variables.
Section F discusses the implication of the case studies taken together.
A. ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Many of the research and planning documents discussed in Part II included
energy-sectoral discussions. With the overall narrative traced, it is useful to
retrace it briefly with a focus on the electric power system. Following this over-
view, the analysis will move toward the energy elements of plans developed after
2015, and then into the active regulatory processes that must integrate climate
change responses.
1. Reviewing 1988 to 2015, Focusing on the Electricity Sector
Between 1988 and 2005, most electric sector climate adaptation policy devel-
opment focused on understanding and assessing the potential impacts of climate
change to the grid. In California, A.B. 4420 instructed the CEC to examine cli-
mate change's potential impacts on "energy supply and demand," and to provide
recommendations for avoiding, reducing, and addressing those impacts;198 the
196. "Thermal generation" is industry terminology for electricity production facilities that use heat to
produce steam, which drives turbines that produce electricity. The most common fuel source for thermal
generation is natural gas, although coal is common elsewhere, and technically nuclear power is also
thermal.
197. A "rate case" is an industry term for the proceeding that determines how much a utility can
charge the customers in its service territory (its rates).
198. A.B. 4420, supra note 90, at §§ 1, 2.
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CEC analyzed climate change's potential to impact hydroelectric supply19  and
recommended incorporating climate change into energy resource planning, pro-
moting renewable electricity generation, promoting high-efficiency gas ele-
ctricity generation, and promoting efficiency measures to reduce electricity
demand.2 0 Abroad, the first three IPCC assessment reports summarized the state
of knowledge regarding the impact that climate change would have on electric
power systems.201
California's PIER program also produced several relevant studies, including
an impact assessment for California's electric power system;202 a method for
evaluating high-elevation hydropower output under varying climate scenarios;20 3
an examination of current climate projections and likelihood of an increase in
extreme heat days in California;2 4 further analyses of hydropower predictions;205
an electricity demand assessment;206 and a review of price incentive programs to
reduce electricity demand.207 The CCAS included an electric-sector specific
199. CEC 1989, supra note 94, at 40-48.
200. CEC 1991, supra note 95, at x.
201. ARI WG3 Report, supra note 16, at 5-11 and 5-17; AR2 WG3 Report, supra note 38, at
376-78, 382, 383, and 390-93; AR3 WG2 Report, supra note 58, at 381-416.
202. GUIDO FRANCO & ALAN SANSTAD, CEC-500-2005-201-SF, Climate Change and Electricity
Demand in California (2005), https://perma.cc/MNK2-PCXT. This identified several prior studies on the
same topic: JOEL B. SMITH & DENNIS TIRPAK (EDS.), EPA-230-05-89-050, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES. REPORT TO CONGRESS, UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (Dec. 1989); Lester W. Baxter & Kevin Calandri, Global warming and
electricity demand: A study of California, 20 ENERGY POL'Y 233-44 (1992); Robert Mendelsohn, The
Impact of Climate Change on Energy Expenditures in California, att' d as App'x XI to WILSON ET AL.,
CEC-500-03-058CF, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND CALIFORNIA: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
ECOSYSTEMS, HEALTH, AND THE ECONOMY (Aug. 2003). Franco & Sanstad's work was later published
as Guido Franco & Alan Sanstad, Climate Change and Electricity Demand in California, 87 CLIMATIC
CHANGE S139-51 (2008), https://perma.cc/X6WG-ZF9P.
203. SEBASTIAN VICUNA ET AL., CEC-500-2005199-SF, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON HIGH
ELEVATION HYDROPOWER GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA'S SIERRA NEVADA: A CASE STUDY IN THE UPPER
AMERICAN RIVER (Mar. 2006), https://perma.cc/H8HW-JGFW.
204. NORMAN MILLER ET AL., CEC-500-2007-023, Climate CHANGE, EXTREME HEAT, AND
ELECTRICITY DEMAND IN CALIFORNIA (2007), https://perma.cc/4MYB-Z7BU.
205. DENNIS LETTENMEIER ET AL., CEC-500-2007-104, EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND
METHODS FOR PREDICTION OF HYDROPOWER RESOURCES IN CALIFORNIA AND THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
(2007), https://perma.cc/4PNZ-MGNB; SEBASTIAN VICUNA ET AL., CEC-500-2009-019-F, CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE OPERATION OF TWO HIGH-ELEVATION HYDROPOWER SYSTEMS IN CALIFORNIA
(2009), https://perma.cc/UYE2-EC8T. See also GUEGAN ET AL., CEC-500-2012-020, CLIMATE CHANGE
EFFECTS ON THE HIGH-ELEVATION HYDROPOWER SYSTEM WITH CONSIDERATION OF WARMING IMPACTS
ON ELECTRICITY DEMAND AND PRICING (2012), https://perma.cc/42SG-MB4M.
206. ANIN AROONRUENGSAWAT & MAXIMILIAN AUFHAMMER, CEC-500-2009-018-D, IMPACTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE ON RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION: EVIDENCE FROM BILLING DATA (2009),
https://perma.cc/X35A-YSWC; see also MAXIMILIAN AUFFHAMMER & ANIN AROONRUENGSAWAT,
CEC-500-2012-021, HOTSPOTS OF CLIMATE DRIVEN INCREASES IN RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY DEMAND:
A SIMULATION EXERCISE BASED ON HOUSEHOLD LEVEL BILLING DATA FOR CALIFORNIA (2012), https://
perma.cc/MA3F-YXHQ.
207. LARRY DALE ET AL., CEC-500-2009-032-F, PRICE IMPACT ON THE DEMAND FOR WATER AND
ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA RESIDENCES (2009).
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planning element (with the CEC the sole energy agency represented),20 8 as did
Safeguarding California.20 9 AR5 WG2 briefly discussed the growing recognition
that the electric power sector may require comprehensive adaptation planning,
but "[w]ith mitigation concerns dominating the literature and urban energy policy
discussions, there is less focus on adaptation issues."2 10
Again, therefore, the conclusion must be that the challenging questions raised
by climate change adaptation, including matters of problem definition, effective-
ness measurement, cost and benefit calculation, and equity, were not addressed
with respect to the electric power sector any more than they had been generally.
2. Federal Policy Development (2015 to 2016)
There is little to say about U.S. federal government climate adaptation policy
development. In 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13653,21 and
federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of Energy, developed their own
strategies and practices, primarily in the form of guidance. In the electricity sec-
tor, this resulted in a national vulnerability assessment first circulated in July
2015, largely duplicative of what California had already contributed.212 Like
California's 2012 APG, this assessment included proposed "resilience solutions"
for the electric grid. The U.S. Department of Energy also piloted a partnership
with energy utilities, including several in California that resulted in utility-
specific vulnerability assessments. However, after the November 2016 election,
the new administration rescinded E.O. 13653213 and these programs have not
continued.
3. Safeguarding California Action Implementation Plan: Energy (2016)
Shortly after California's E.O. B-30-15 mandated sectoral plans for Safe-
guarding California, the CEC and CPUC arranged a joint workshop with the
primary California electric utilities (four investor-owned and one municipally-
owned entity). The workshop was held on July 27, 2015, and included presenta-
tions from the U.S. Department of Energy, the CEC, OPR, and California's large
investor-owned utilities, but not the CPUC or the CAISO (the two organizations
primarily responsible for regulating and operating California's electric grid).
Following the workshop, the CEC, with one participant from the CPUC and sev-
eral participants from the California Department of General Services (given their
208. CCAS, supra note 127, ch. X, pp. 122-134.
209. SAFEGUARDING CALIFORNIA, supra note 162, at 104-27.
210. AR5 WG2 Report, supra note 75, at chs. 8 and 10.
211. Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,819 (Nov. 6, 2013).
212. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, Climate Change and the U.S. Energy Sector: Regional
Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions (2015), https://perma.cc/SUJ2-4Y2J.
213. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
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knowledge of building energy efficiency), drafted the state's Energy Sector
Implementation Action Plan.214
This new plan highlighted initiatives that had been undertaken for other rea-
sons, reframed as adaptation actions.2" It included a lengthy discussion of renew-
ables integration and descriptions of numerous existing energy efficiency and
demand-side management programs, each of which was not primarily developed
as a resiliency program, although they may provide resiliency co-benefits. As the
document itself said: the actions discussed were "more related to developing new
information via research projects and less oriented towards the substantial invest-
ments that implementation of adaptation measures will require,"2 16 while "future
adaptation studies for the energy sector will include consideration of costs" and
specifically compare "the cost of doing nothing with the cost of different adapta-
tion measures."217
The last several pages were devoted to "next steps": to create a CPUC-CEC
work group to "design, implement, and monitor the actions listed below;" to com-
plete vulnerability assessments for each electric utility service territory; to
"[c]ollaborate with research needs and efforts with the [CEC] Commissions to
ensure that research produces actionable science and investment and operational
parameters;" and to "[e]ncourage cooperation and collaboration among all utilities
and the various regional climate resilience collaboratives."218 On the last pages,
the document discussed the need for agreement on the definition of metrics-for
example, cooling degree days-but no discussion of how that could be done.219
4. Safeguarding California Plan: 2018 Update (January 2018)
In January 2018, responsible agencies published an update to Safeguarding
California ("2018 Update").2 2 Unlike previous iterations, this version included a
vision: that climate adaptation would be integrated as standard practice, with the vul-
nerable protected, natural systems functioning, and built systems continuing to pro-
vide essential services. The plan also provided "overarching principles" (also finding
expression in legislation and elsewhere), including to consider climate change in all
levels of government, to involve vulnerable communities in decisionmaking, and to
identify funding sources for climate adaptation and disaster response.
The 2018 Update's energy element was written primarily by CEC research staff,
with unspecified contributions from the CPUC and the Department of General
214. CNRA, Energy Sector Plan, in SAFEGUARDING CALIFORNIA: IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLANS
68-90 (2016).
215. See id. at 73-87.
216. Id. at 87.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 88.
219. Id. at 241-45.
220. CNRA, SAFEGUARDING CALIFORNIA PLAN: 2018 UPDATE (2018), https://perma.cc/ZNH5-
VRAF.
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Services. It provided six sector-specific goals: (1) continue to support climate
research; (2) use common climate scenarios in all energy planning; (3) incorporate
climate adaptation into energy planning; (4) support local adaptation efforts; (5)
improve CalAdapt; and (6) increase resiliency in vulnerable communities.
5. 2017 IEPR Adaptation Chapter (March 2018)
Finally, as part of its regulatory functions (discussed in greater detail below),
the CEC drafted a biennial Integrated Energy Policy Report ("IEPR"). The 2017
IEPR (published March 2018) included, for the first time, an entire chapter on cli-
mate adaptation and electric grid resiliency.22 As with other recent reports, this
one included a great deal of summary and review of past events. It also devoted
space to the CEC's ongoing efforts to develop load projections that account for
climate change (see discussion below). In its recommendations, the IEPR noted
that the electric utilities had reported that the most important developments were
ongoing in the RAMP proceedings (also discussed below) and made a series of
recommendations pointed toward ensuring that this information was available.
6. Conclusions: California Electric Sector Adaptation Policy
The materials discussed above do not address the most significant regulatory
processes related to grid infrastructure and most in need of climate adaptation
planning, several of which are examined below. It is also notable that the agen-
cies that manage and operate the grid (and regulate the grid's operators), particu-
larly the CAISO and the CPUC, were rarely involved in the state's climate
adaptation policy development for the electric power sector.
Instead, most of the pertinent decisions have occurred in technical forums that
are only slightly more readily accessible to the public than have been the state's
policy processes, the subject of the four case studies below.
B. CASE 1: CLIMATE RISK IN ELECTRIC GRID RELIABILITY PLANNING PROCESSES
Electric service reliability means keeping the lights on, and the applicable
standards have changed a great deal in the last fifteen years. After 50 million peo-
ple lost electric power during the Northeast blackout in August 2003,222 Congress
included grid reliability planning mandates in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.223
The law required a single entity to promulgate national bulk electric system
221. CEC, Chapter 10: Climate Adaptation and Resiliency, in 2017 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY
REPORT (2018).
222. See U.S.-CANADA POWER SYSTEM OUTAGE TASK FORCE 2004, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST
14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2004),
https://perma.cc/M4BM-7MTZ.
223. Pub. L. 109-58 (Aug. 8, 2005).
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reliability standards, which thereafter would be mandatory nationwide.2 24 The
National Electric Reliability Corporation ("NERC") undertook to develop these
standards. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved NERC's first
proposed nationwide reliability standards in 2007,225 and the standards continue
to be followed and updated.226
NERC reliability standard implementation flows downwards. Below NERC,
Regional Reliability Councils conduct regional reliability planning.2 27 The
California service territory is within the Western Electricity Coordinating
Council ("WECC") region.228 Beneath the regional organizations, independent
transmission operators, among them the CAISO, are responsible for conduct-
ing long-term transmission planning to support system reliability.229 Beneath
the transmission planners, state regulators implement state-level transmission
planning and approval processes230 and regulate the local electric utilities-
which conduct their own reliability planning as well. Typically, each of these
entities also participates in the procedures of the entities above them in the hi-
erarchy, but not below. For example, California's large privately-owned util-
ities participate in or contribute to CPUC, CAISO, WECC, and NERC
processes, but NERC does not participate in CPUC proceedings. Multiple deci-
sion processes may therefore incorporate climate considerations. It makes
sense to start at NERC and work downwards.
1. NERC Standard Development Process
NERC promulgates reliability standards for a broad range of bulk electric
power system operations and planning processes-from moment-to-moment fre-
quency management, to years-long system resource planning activities. Among
these, NERC's transmission planning standard, TPL-001-4,231 is the primary
nexus for climate-relevant data.
In simplified summary, electric grid reliability planning requires forecasts of
three things: load (the amount of electric demand, spread across space),
224. 16 U.S.C. § 824o.
225. Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power System, Order No. 693, FERC Stats. &
Regs. 1 31,242 at 1433-49, order on reh'g, Order No. 693-A, 120 FERC ¶ 61,053 (2007).
226. See Standards, N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., https://perma.cc/7256-VP9S (last visited Oct.
21, 2019).
227. See Regional Standards Development, N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., https://perma.cc/4DJG-
SHEF (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
228. See Standards, W. Elec. Coordinating Council, https://perma.cc/689Y-DTCR (last visited Oct.
21, 2019).
229. See Transmission Planning Process, CAISO, https://perma.cc/E9SJ-NFV2 (last visited Oct. 21,
2019).
230. See, e.g., Integrated Resource Plan and Long Term Procurement Plan, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
https://perma.cc/ZNM5-6GTB (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
231. NERC, Standard TPL-001-4: Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements,
Version 4 (adopted Oct. 17, 2013), https://perma.cc/TYA6-4KPM.
276 [Vol. 32:227
TOOLS FOR REGULATORS IN A CHANGING CLIMATE
generation (the amount of available electric supply, also spread across space),
and transmission (the physical capacity of the links between load and generation
points, passing through space). System reliability planning is a function of ensur-
ing adequate generating and transmission capacity to serve load under all reason-
ably foreseeable operating conditions. Grid planners have limited control over
electric demand and only a bit more over generator availability. Centralized grid
planning, then, must make (very) educated guesses about how much electric
demand will exist, where, and how much generating capacity will exist, where, in
the future. They then build the grid that allows future generating resources to
transmit electricity to future load. All of the forecasts underlying this process
involve climate-relevant data. Transmission planning standards, then, require a
unification of many other forecasting processes, each of which may itself inte-
grate climate-relevant data.
TPL-001-4 requires transmission planning coordinators to maintain models of
the electric power system representing existing transmission facilities, planned
generating facilities, and load forecasts. These conditions are used to generate
modeling scenarios, which stress the system in various ways-typically by deter-
mining system conditions under peak load (e.g., what is happening on the hottest
day of the year), and then applying contingencies to determine sensitivities. The
most important of these contingencies involves removal of a major system ele-
ment (e.g., a large power plant), followed by automatic system readjustment, fol-
lowed by the loss of a second important element (e.g., a major transmission line).
If the system collapses (a major blackout), planners propose corrective actions
that would have avoided that outcome. The NERC standard also includes an
extreme events testing scenario, developed to examine events such as pipeline
explosions or a plane crash into a transmission corridor with multiple lines pres-
ent, but also including "wide area events ... based on System topology," such as
wildfires, loss of cooling water, and severe weather (e.g., a hurricane).232 The
standards define the data and modeling rules that planners must use.
NERC is not blind to the changing climate conditions into which its standards
must function. However, to date NERC has not made climate change risk assess-
ment a priority. NERC's Reliability Issues Steering Committee ("RISC") con-
ducts regular reviews of the reliability standards to ensure that they incorporate
realistic threat assessment.233 Recently, those processes have identified the high-
priority risks to be cyberattack, poor risk management culture in responsible enti-
ties, and insufficient real-time monitoring capacity-concerns that, when "risk"
is the focus, are likely to always take precedence over climate risk. Until recently,
climate change was categorized as a low-priority risk that affirmatively would
not be subject to additional standard development. In 2013, this changed when a
232. Id. at 11.
233. See Reliability Issues Steering Committee, N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., https://perma.cc/
W77C-HXRU (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
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fifth high-risk category was created from a conglomeration of many previously
low-priority risks involving the changing physical and regulatory environment
within which reliability must occur-changes that include not only new technolo-
gies and regulatory structures, but also climate change.234 However, this prema-
ture combination of technological, regulatory, and climate risk into a unified
category may make it more difficult to develop best practices around climate
alone.
The situation has not changed much since 2013. In February 2018, NERC
RISC published an update that tracked development of its risk categorization
processes. Regarding extreme weather, it concluded that there was less risk than
previously estimated:
The RISC believed the impact is better characterized as "decreasing" from last
year's report because although there have been more severe weather events,
the grid has responded well. Severe weather or other natural events (e.g., hurri-
canes, tornadoes, protracted extreme temperatures, geomagnetic disturbances
(GMDs), flooding, earthquakes, forest fires, extreme icing, etc.) are some of
the leading causes of outages, and the industry must remain vigilant in improv-
ing preparation and coordination in order to minimize the effect of such
events. 35
That is, NERC's reliability risk steering committee concluded that extreme
weather grid risks were in fact decreasing and did not appear to consider the stress
on the bulk system imposed by changing temperature and precipitation, whether
alone or in combination with the changing resource mix that is also stressing the
grid, to be a serious problem. The RISC proposed that in the five-year timeframe,
NERC should begin to assess analytic data about grid operation under severe
weather conditions. In the ten-year timeframe, the RISC recommended incorpo-
rating information from whatever extreme weather events had occurred by that
date.236
As a policy development question then, it appears that NERC is aware of the
climate adaptation problem but believes that it is not urgent compared to other
risks, and in any event will be folded into existing processes. NERC does not
appear to have taken a strong position on the type of weather data that must be
incorporated into load forecasting models or the kind of disaster risk frequency
assumptions that should drive, for example, wildfire risk assessment, and it may
be underestimating the risks posed by climate change to grid reliability. This cer-
tainly seems to be the case in California, where, as explained below, regional
entities are stepping in to address the gap NERC has left.
234. NERC RISC, ERO PRIORITIEs: RISC UPDATES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2013), https://
perma.cc/U5ZM-DJEC.
235. NERC RISC, ERO RELIABILITY RISK PRIORITIES: RISC RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NERC
BOARD OF TRUSTEES 13 (2018), https://perma.cc/PT8J-YM4M.
236. See id. at 25.
278 [Vol. 32:227
TOOLS FOR REGULATORS IN A CHANGING CLIMATE
2. WECC Reliability Planning Process
WECC is the electric grid reliability planning coordinator for the Western
United States, responsible for regional modeling and risk assessment under
NERC's standards. WECC recognizes that the Western grid is uniquely exposed
to climate variability and weather extremes.23 7 Recently, WECC developed its
first reliability modeling scenario specifically designed to incorporate climate
change data. The Energy-Water-Climate Change Scenario ("EWCC") was for-
mulated to assess: "What are the most significant system impacts in the Western
Interconnection that could result from changes to the climate and to what extent
do those impacts on the electrical grid present risks to electric system reliabil-
ity?" 238 The scenario is predicated upon a 30 F increase in global average surface
temperature by 2034 and incorporates impact data based on professional judg-
ment about what such a warming would entail for grid-relevant modeling param-
eters. A consultant developed the specific parameters, recommending a modeling
case that included a 10% increase over baseline Pacific Northwest peak summer
load; a 3% increase over baseline California peak summer load; a 5% summer
capacity derate for steam turbines (due to warmer cooling water); a 15% reduc-
tion in Pacific Northwest hydropower output; a 20% reduction in Arizona hydro-
power output; and a 50% reduction in California hydropower output, however
with no changes in gas turbine efficiency or solar PV performance (possible due
to ambient air heating) and no changes to transmission efficiencies.239
Whether or not this is a reasonable scenario for climate-based stress-testing, it
is important to recognize that the EWCC is only one scenario. It treats climate
change as a single potential future event, rather than as a certainty that will mani-
fest along a broad range of possibilities. EWCC can tell a great deal about what
will happen under the specific stated conditions, but it cannot resolve the funda-
mental planning uncertainty: what should we do if the model shows us that the
grid collapses under this scenario? Should we spend money to avoid the impact?
How much? Answers depend on impossible determinations regarding the likeli-
hood of the scenario itself, as compared to others, which the scenario does not-
and currently cannot-begin to address.
3. CAISO Transmission Planning Process
NERC develops standards and WECC ensures that he Western Interconnect
remains stable, but primary transmission planning responsibility devolves to
smaller entities-whoever owns and manages the transmission grid in regional
237. See WECC, 2016 STATE OF THE INTERCONNECTION iv (2016), https://pena.cc/8HGK-AKUM.
238. WECC Scenario Planning Steering Group, ENERGY-WATER-CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIO
REPORT 13 (2015), https://perma.cc/U43J-PUS7.
239. Kahrl et al., CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE WESTERN INTERCONNECTION: RECOMM-
ENDATIONS FOR WECC'S ENERGY-WATER CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIO 15, 18, 20, 22, 24 (2015),
https://perma.cc/4MRU-ATS7.
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service territories. In California, this entity is the CAISO, an independent nonprofit
organization that conducts statewide transmission planning and operates both the
energy markets and physical transmission system that keeps electricity flowing
from generators to consumers across California. As part of its duties, the CAISO
conducts an annual Transmission Planning Process ("TPP"). The TPP develops
the state's base case for transmission planning purposes, against which specialized
scenarios may be compared to provide additional insight into potential needs.
According to the CAISO's 2018-2019 TPP study plan (finalized in March
2018),240 the CAISO incorporates reliability studies conducted according to TPL-
001-4, with these studies performed for various grid levels, including utility bulk
transmission systems and local distribution areas (e.g., all Northern California
transmission lines, Greater Bay Area transmission and distribution, etc.).
Specifically, its planning processes are based on:
[t]he 1-in-10 weather year, mid demand baseline case with low [Additional
Achievable Energy Efficiency (AAEE) and Additional Achievable Photovoltaic
(AAPV)] savings load forecasts will be used in PG&E, SCE, SDG&E, and VEA
local area studies including the studies for the local capacity requirement (LCR)
areas. The 1-in-5 weather year, mid demand baseline with mid AAEE and AAPV
savings load forecast will be used for system studies.241
That is, large utility service territory transmission systems must be built assum-
ing low load reduction due to energy efficiency and solar power integration ("low
AAEE and AAPV"), and peak demand adjusted for past temperatures in a "1-in-
10 weather year" (more discussion below), while the state's high-voltage, "back-
bone" transmission system must be built to survive peak demand in a "1-in-5
weather year" assuming mid-level efficiency load reductions and mid-level solar
power rollout ("mid AAEE and AAPV"). "The assessment will utilize the 2017
California Energy Demand Revised Forecast 2018-2028 adopted by the California
Energy Commission (CEC) on February 21, 2018," with loads spread across the
utility service territories according to methodologies developed by the utilities.2 42
This densely-packed paragraph is the most complete description of the data used
to build the CAISO's 2018 TPP. It describes multiple components that must each,
in turn, be evaluated for the inclusion and treatment of climate-relevant data.
4. The CAISO's Demand Assumptions: CEC CED (February 2018)
As just explained, the CAISO TPP will rely upon load assumptions developed
in the CEC's California Energy Demand ("CED") 2018 forecast.243 This forecast
240. CAISO, 2018-2019 TRANSMISSION PLANNING PROCESS UNIFIED PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AND
STUDY PLAN (2018), https://perma.cc/ULF2-393F.
241. Id. at 12.
242. Id.
243. CEC, DRAFT STAFF REPORT: CALIFORNIA ENERGY DEMAND 2018-2030 REVISED FORECAST
(2018), https://perma.cc/PQ8C-6KD3.
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does incorporate information about climate change. This was done by choosing
climate change scenario forecasts that seemed, in staff judgment, to be
reasonable:
To estimate the potential of future climate change to impact electricity and
natural gas consumption and peak demand, [CEC Energy Assessment
Division] staff used temperature scenarios developed by the Scripps
Institution of Oceanography through a set of global climate change models,
where results are downscaled to 50-square-mile grids in California. Multiple
scenarios were generated by Scripps, and staff from the Energy
Commission's Research and Development Division chose a "likely" and a
more aggressive scenario for use in the CED 2017 Revised mid and high
cases, respectively. The low demand case assumes no additional impacts
from climate change.2 4 4
Combining this information with the CAISO's TPP plan description, it is
possible to conclude that the TPP models will incorporate the Scripps-devel-
oped climate change scenario that CEC staff determined was "likely" in both
the statewide and utility service territory reliability assessments, both of
which use the "mid demand baseline." However, CEC's public report did not
explain the "weather year" concept referenced by CED 2018, and did not dis-
close which Scripps climate scenarios, exactly, CEC used, or why the CEC
determined that a "likely" scenario is the appropriate choice for grid reliabil-
ity testing. These questions are examined in Subsection 6, infra. It must be
emphasized that the information just provided is the totality of what was pub-
licly available without the review of the administrative record in Subsection
6, infra.
5. The CAISO's Generator Assumptions: CPUC Default Scenario (February
2018)
As explained above, the CAISO TPP will model generators based on the
CPUC's Default Scenario developed in the Integrated Resource Planning ("IRP")
proceeding, CPUC Rulemaking (R.) 16-02-007. IRP is the process by which the
CPUC ensures that, as California transforms its electric power system to achieve
state GHG emissions targets, it does so in a financially responsible manner.245 It
involves running RESOLVE, a capacity expansion model, to determine the eco-
nomically optimal mix of resources to achieve GHG reduction targets while not
threatening electric service reliability.
244. Id. at 41 (emphases added).
245. See S.B. 350 (2015) (De Le6n) (An act to add Section 44258.5 to the Health and Safety Code,
etc.), 2015 Cal. Stat. Ch. 547, https://perma.cc/H8KH-Z7XV; S.B. 338 (2017) (Skinner) (An act to
amend Sections 454.52 and 9621 of the Public Utilities Code, relating to energy), 2017 Cal. Stat. 2017
Ch. 389, https://perma.cc/H8KH-Z7XV.
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According to the IRP proceeding's unified assumptions,246 the IRP default gen-
erator forecasts will assume achievement of the state's 50% renewable portfolio
standard and incorporate available demand response and energy storage resour-
ces.247 However, it does not appear that the generator models will incorporate cli-
mate change impacts on the state's hydropower resources. Rather, it assumes that
existing hydroelectric capacity will remain online during the planning period,
which, as already discussed, is unlikely.24 Thus, it incorporates projections of
hydropower availability that do not change between now and 2030. The model
imagines that in 2030, large hydro will continue to make up 7.9% of the state's
generation capacity, and 9% of the state's energy production.249 This is not con-
sistent with the WECC EWCC climate change scenario that would test the system
with California hydropower reduced by 50% in 2034. It also does not include in-
formation necessary to adjust nameplate capacity due to thermal efficiency losses.
6. Investigating Public Disclosure: What Climate Dataset Is CAISO Using?
The CAISO and the CEC explained that the CEC's demand forecast incorpo-
rated climate scenario data from the Scripps Institute. However, no published report
disclosed which Scripps climate scenarios were chosen by CEC staff for use in the
mid- and high-demand scenarios, nor what assumptions are baked into the various
"weather years" used. This required investigating the state's regulatory dockets.
a. 2017 IEPR Hearings
In order to determine which climate-relevant data had been used in the CEC's
forecasts (and simultaneously to evaluate the level of public discussion of this in-
formation), all documents in CEC Docket 17-IEPR-03 (the 2017 IEPR load fore-
casting docket) were downloaded, combined, made text-searchable (where not
already so formatted) and searched (2,147 pages) for the words "Scripps," and
"weather year." As explained below, the Scripps data were only mentioned twice,
during the testimony of a single person: a staff member in the CEC's Energy
Assessments Division responsible for coordinating the CEC's technical forecast-
ing work. These brief disclosures, however, were insufficient to determine which
information, exactly, was used.
As a preliminary matter, the CEC hearings included a brief discussion that illu-
minated the "weather year" concept.25 0 CEC staff explained that the "weather
246. CPUC, Decision (D.) 18-02-018 (Feb. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/DSZ6-QNUD (Decision
Setting Requirements for Load Serving Entities Filing Integrated Resource Plans).
247. Id. at 31-34.
248. Id. at 34, 86-87.
249. Id. at 86, 87.
250. See CEC, Transcript of February 22, 2017 IEPR Commissioner Workshop on Data Inputs and
Assumptions for IEPR Modeling and Forecasting Activities, CEC Docket 17-IEPR-03 (TN# 216424), at
20-25, https://perma.cc/2A25-LH3J.
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year" is a metric for determining peak load and described a statistical process that
resulted in distributed estimates of peak load depending on weather. However,
staff explained that the projections were based on the past 15 years of weather
data, and therefore do not appear to include adjustments for future climate
change. That means the only climate change adjustments to CEC's load forecast
(and by extension the TPP) will be made using scenario data from Scripps. The
question remains: which?
In 2017, the only two references to the Scripps data in the entire IEPR docket
appeared during CEC staff testimony to the Commission during two hearings
on IEPR technical development. During an early presentation, CEC staff dis-
cussed the assumptions used in the demand forecast and noted in passing that
climate forecasts had been used.2 51 In a later hearing, they explained: "We
weren't able to get the newest [climate] scenarios in time for this Preliminary
Forecast. So what we're using for this, for now, is what we used in 2015 as a
placeholder. But for the Revised Forecast, we'll be incorporating the newest
temperature scenarios."2
These two passing references during two slideshow presentations from CEC
staff to one CEC Commissioner constituted the total public discussion of the
incorporation of climate data into the forecasts that will be used to plan for
California's long-term electric power grid reliability in 2018.253
b. 2015 IEPR Hearings
In one of those references, CEC staff mentioned "[data] we used in 2015."
To assess whether more information was made available in an earlier proceed-
ing, all documents in CEC Docket 15-IEPR-03 (the 2015 IEPR load forecast-
ing proceeding) were downloaded, combined, made text-searchable (where not
already so formatted) and searched (3,241 pages) for the word "Scripps." This
revealed that there had been some additional discussion of the process in prior
years:
[CEC STAFF]: Climate change impacts, we get temperature scenarios pro-
duced for us by the Scripps Institute of Oceanography and they provide
251. Id. at 129-130; see also Presentation: IEPR 2017-02-22 Workshop: Timeline, Forecast
Structure, and Remaining Inputs and Assumptions for 2017 IEPR Demand Forecast, CEC Docket 17-
IEPR-03 (TN# 216141), at 9, https://perma.cc/V6KN-648S.
252. Transcript of August 3, 2017 IEPR Lead Commissioner Workshop on the 2017 CA Energy
Demand Preliminary Electricity Demand Forecast, CEC Docket 17-IEPR-03 (TN# 220936), at 18-19,
https://perma.cc/K3M5-AHQR; Presentation: IEPR 2017-08-03 Workshop: California Energy Demand
2018-2028 Preliminary Electricity and Natural Gas Baseline Forecast: CEC Docket 17-IEPR-03 (TN#
220503), at 16, https://perma.cc/KXB2-9HW2.
253. A search of all of the materials on the CEC's Demand Analysis Working Group (DAWG)
(Google search: site:dawg.info "climate change" and site:dawg.info "climate change & scripps")
showed that while climate change was often mentioned in passing, the CEC's work on the Scripps data
does not ever appear to have been discussed here either.
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multiple scenarios, 12 to 15. And we typically choose one of the higher scenar-
ios, in terms of temperature change, to use in the high demand case. And in the
mid demand case we pick a scenario from Scripps right around in the
middle.5 4
That is, the choice of scenario was the result of a conversation between
CEC staff and the scenario developers at Scripps, resulting in the incorpora-
tion of two scenarios-"most likely" and "high" climate change scenario-
the details of which were never discussed in the public record. Commissioners
and staff did discuss challenges that were cropping up in their modeling selec-
tion approach, in a discussion that provides additional insight into their
process:
[CEC STAFF]: ... we have typically just taken the scenarios and said, "Okay,
here's one roughly in the middle temperature wise. Here's one towards the
end. This will be our high, this will be our mid." But you end up sometimes
with what we have in this case with a larger increase in minimum temperatures
and something in the Mid Case. So what I'm planning to do is to talk to
Scripps about developing a distribution, so we can have something more con-
sistent in our scenarios... .255
This discussion implies that the CEC technical team had internal discussions
regarding the implications of their climate scenario data, but that these were left
to staff to work out, without input or oversight from either the Commission or the
public. It became an issue once in 2015, when incorporating the scenarios yielded
an unexpected result (lower demand in a hotter scenario), at which point it was
noted that the process the CEC staff have been developing has some inherent
limitations.
Overall, therefore, it was not possible to determine from the public record
exactly what climate data was used in the CEC's demand forecast, or how it was
incorporated.
254. Transcript of the Feb. 26, 2015 IEPR Workshop on Electricity and Natural Gas Model Inputs,
CEC Docket 15-IEPR-03 (TN# 204949), at 42-43 (emphasis added), https://perma.cc/527W-DSZZ; see
also Transcript of May 21, 2015 IEPR Commissioner Workshop on Preliminary Natural Gas Outlook,
CEC Docket 15-IEPR-03 (TN# 204977), at 29, https://perma.cc/8L64-K5YE ("We incorporate potential
climate change on atural gas demand by employing scenarios, temperature scenarios provided to us
from the Scripps Institute of Oceanography. And we convert those temperature scenarios into changes in
heating degree days, which affect natural gas demand."); Transcript of the July 7, 2015 IEPR
Commissioner Workshop on the 2015 California Energy Demand Preliminary Electricity Forecast, CEC
Docket 17-IEPR-03, (TN# 205689), at 31-32, https://perma.cc/N7VJ-UPER ("[W]hat we asked Scripps
to do was provide us, among all the different scenarios that they've run, a case, a scenario that's roughly
in the middle in terms of temperature increase, and then one that's more at the high end, for our high
demand case. . . . we match our weather stations . . . to the appropriate 50-square-mile grid. And from
that we get projections of increases in maximum temperatures and, also, changes in heating and cooling
degree days.").
255. See CEC Transcript of February 22, 2017, supra note 250, at 33-37.
284 [Vol. 32:227
TOOLS FOR REGULATORS IN A CHANGING CLIMATE
7. Grid Reliability Planning: Conclusions
To summarize the findings in this section:
* NERC has not integrated climate change into its reliability standards. The
problem is recognized but is not a priority.
* Over the last several years, WECC has engaged a consultant to create a
"most likely" climate scenario for sensitivity analysis. WECC does not
otherwise model climate change.
* CAISO uses CEC demand forecasts that integrate data on changing tem-
peratures, but the TPP does not account for climate change in its generator
or transmission model data.
The CAISO TPP's incomplete incorporation of climate change into its grid
models means that California's current grid reliability planning process prob-
ably overestimates grid reliability in the face of a changing climate.
Compounding this, the opportunity for public review and comment on any of
these matters is extremely low. The above review suggests that technical
experts analyzing climate risks speak primarily to each other and explain their
work in only summary fashion to decisionmakers, who contribute their own ex-
pertise but also tend to accept what their staff conclude regarding the many
technical choices that must be made. Third parties often do not participate at
all and lack the resources and expertise to review and advise on the modeling
process. Consequently, little pressure is exerted on those in charge of these
processes to provide more detailed justifications or explanations of their work.
Without increased opportunities for public participation and oversight, it is
likely that no such pressure will be felt unless and until a disaster has already
occurred.
C. CASE 2: WILDFIRE RISK MAPPING AROUND POWER LINES
Climate change contributes to increased wildfire risk. Changing precipita-
tion and temperature patterns contribute to increased flammable biomass
concentration. The electric grid interacts with this risk in both directions:
grid malfunctions that create sparks are likely to start fires, those fires are
increasingly likely to be much more ferocious, and increasingly ferocious
wildfires, regardless of the ignition point, are likely to impact the electric
grid.
Electric utility fire risk management in California is guided by a unified map.
Following a serious wildfire in October 2007 that impacted the electric grid, the
CPUC initiated R. 08-11-005 (later R. 15-05-006) and began developing a state-
wide fire risk map usable by the electric utilities to guide their vegetation man-
agement activities. The first "Fire Map" was developed to identify high-risk areas
based on "fire weather" calculations. Then, according to frameworks set down in
2020] 285
THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW
a series of CPUC decisions,256 the electric utilities, working together with CPUC
and CAL FIRE, incorporated additional data into a final statewide Fire Risk Map
against which electric utility infrastructure could be compared. The new map's
risk zones are made enforceable through revisions to CPUC General Order 95,25
which creates new construction and vegetation management requirements in high
fire-risk zones.
The map is built from the following data sources: Tier 1 High Hazard Zones
("HHZ") on the U.S. Forest Service-CAL FIRE Joint Tree Mortality Task Force
map of HHZs; cells on the CPUC's Fire Map 1 with a Utility Fire-Threat Index
value that is equal to or greater than 800; cells on CAL FIRE's Fire Resource and
Assessment Program ("FRAP") map of fire threats classified as High, Very High,
or Extreme; historic fire perimeter data (all causes) in CAL FIRE's FRAP data-
base; and communities at risk from wildfire ("CARs") in areas classified as
"Very High" on CAL FIRE's map of Fire Hazard Severity Zones ("FHSZs").
Essentially, the CPUC map is a compilation of spatial data that shows high and
severe fire risk areas, against which the electric utilities are supposed to overlay
maps of their grid infrastructure.
It is possible to review how each of these data sources treats climate change.
The HHZ tree mortality maps were created by combining information on dead
trees and fire threat zones.258 To determine dead trees, CAL FIRE has been
conducting statewide aerial and on-the-ground tree mortality surveys. To
determine fire threat, CAL FIRE combines information on likelihood of fire
occurrence and expected fire behavior under severe weather conditions.259
Current CAL FIRE guidance specifies "using historical fire rotation for a forest
type and region" in on-the-ground fire risk assessment. In other words, the
HHZ maps are based on data for current flammable biomass and historic fire
risk. They do not incorporate forecast data, meaning they do not account for
future climate change.
Fire Map 2 also incorporates areas scoring above 800 on CPUC's Fire Map 1.
This earlier map was developed by the CPUC in 2016.260 "Fire Map 1 depicts
areas of California where there is an elevated hazard for the ignition and rapid
spread of power-line fires due to strong winds, abundant dry vegetation, and other
environmental conditions."21 The maps were built on weather data from 2004 to
2013 to calculate number of fire weather days, potential wind speeds, and then-
256. See, e.g., CPUC D. 17-01-009 (Jan. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/2LJY-UTBX; D. 17-06-024, at
2 (June 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/9TP2-AVW8; D. 17-12-024, at 2 (Dec. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/
L7Y7-97F2.
257. CPUC, General Order 95: Rules for Overhead Electric Line Construction, at I-8, VIII-9
(rev. Dec. 2017), https://perma.cc/8FEM-TQ2G.
258. See CAL FIRE, Description of CAL FIRE's High Hazard Zone Determination Pursuant to
Governor Brown's October 30, 2015 Proclamation of a State of Emergency (2015).
259. See Rapid Assessment of Fire Threat v. 2, CAL FIRE (Rev. June 20, 2017).
260. CPUC D. 16-05-036, at 2 (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/T446-TA7X.
261. Id. at 2.
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current vegetation conditions.262 There was no effort made to adjust these values
for possible future climate change. Fire Map 2 also incorporates CAL FIRE's
Fire Threat Map.263 This map, in turn, was developed on CAL FIRE scoring of
Fuel Rank and Fire Rotation.264 The Fuel Rank map, in turn, is based on Surface
Fuels data.265 The Surface Fuels mapping methodology explains that this is built
on current vegetation states, i.e., not incorporating climate predictions.266 Fire
Rotation, meanwhile, also uses historical data to rank fire frequency.267 Finally,
Fire Map 2 incorporates the mapping data from CAL FIRE's Fire Hazard
Severity Zones project.268 These maps assess not the risk of fire, but the risk that
if a fire occurs, it will cause a great deal of damage. Like CAL FIRE's Fire Threat
Map, the FHSZ are designed based on current, not projected, conditions.269 This
is also true of the communities at risk dataset, which is built using the same
data.270
The monumental task of mapping the areas in California exposed to wildfire
risk has just begun to impose requirements in existing risk zones and has not yet
made any progress mapping risks that are likely to develop as the result of climate
change. This is particularly concerning where, as discussed above, the CAISO
TPP is not performing wildfire impact reliability testing. Catastrophic wildfire
impacts, therefore, are likely to continue to be a major and increasing threat to the
grid. This appears to remain an item of discussion and concern (e.g., at the 2018
Fire Safety and Utility En Banc held by the CPUC),271 but no progress has been
made on incorporating climate change into the fire risk maps on which utility
wildfire management is based. In one respect the CPUC's Fire Map 2 proceedings
surpass the grid reliability proceedings discussed above: it is relatively easy to
determine and assess what data are being used. This is largely thanks to CAL
262. Id. at 7-10.
263. D. 17-06-024, at A-4 (June 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/9TP2-AVW8.
264. Fire Threat Map, CAL FIRE, https://web.archive.org/web/20161223141558/https://frap.fire.ca.
gov/data/frapgismaps/pdfs/fthreat_map.pdf. The explanation of the map's data sources is printed on the
map, which points to a defunct web link.
265. Fuel Rank: Potential Fire Behavior, CAL FIRE, Map ID: FRNK_MAP, https://web.archive.
org/web/20171218235814/https://frap.fire.ca.gov/data/frapgismaps/pdfs/frnk_map.pdf. The Fuel Rank
map methodology is described at https://web.archive.org/web/20161230071057/http://frap.cdf.ca.gov/
data/fire _data/fuel _rank/index.
266. The Surface Fuels Mapping Methodology was described online. Surface Fuels Maps and Data,
CAL FIRE, https://perma.cc/L52A-V8KR.
267. CAL FIRE, TRENDS IN WILDLAND FIRE 12-19 (Oct. 2003), https://web.archive.org/web/
20181221233526/https://frap.fire.ca.gov/data/assessment2003/Chapter3_Quality/wildfiretrends_2.pdf.
268. See Fire Hazard Severity Zone R-Mapping Project, CAL FIRE, https://perma.cc/W9Y3-695Q.
269. Dave Sapsis, Fire Hazard Severity Zoning Draft Map Review and Validation, https://web.
archive.org/web/20161220203250/http://frap.fire.ca.gov/projects/hazard/FireHazard_Zoningworkshop_
1_8.ppt (explaining the fire hazard severity zoning model methodology).
270. See Fire Hazard Severity Zone R-Mapping Project, supra note 268.
271. Agenda, CPUC Fire Safety and Utility Infrastructure En Banc (Jan. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/
P6GJ-Z4FChttps://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/Safety/Fire Saf ty
and Utility Infrastructure En Banc Agenda FINAL 1.31.2018.pdf.
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FIRE's careful online documentation, but also a product of having data sources
printed directly on the final map.
Certainly, however, there is room for improvement. The Fire Map proceedings
pose significant hurdles to public participation: a stakeholder would need to be
able to navigate not only the CPUC decisionmaking process that resulted in the
Fire Map, but also the numerous decisionmaking processes that resulted in CAL
FIRE's maps and the expert working group processes that were actually involved
in translating the CAL FIRE materials to CPUC purposes.
D. CASE 3: SEA LEVEL RISE IN LARGE THERMAL GENERATION SITING
Construction and expansion of electric power system infrastructure typically
requires review and approval by multiple government agencies, all of which have
their own standards, procedures, and requisite data inputs. Climate change poses
new risks to this infrastructure-including risks in coastal areas and flood zones
threatened by sea level rise and changing storm and precipitation patterns.
Although numerous planning and permitting processes exist, this review focuses
on the specialized requirements for construction of large thermal generating sta-
tions, i.e., power plants with nameplate capacities above 50 megawatts that burn
coal or natural gas. Such plants must be reviewed and approved by both CEC and
CPUC.27 2 None of these regulations specifically requires climate change adapta-
tion to be incorporated, and therefore it is necessary to examine the proceedings
themselves to see how this has been accomplished.
CEC Power Plant Site Certifications are docketed online. To support this
review, docketed files for four pending large thermal generating station appli-
cations were downloaded, combined, made text-searchable (where not already
so formatted) and searched for climate-relevant keywords including "sea level
rise" and "flooding."273 The preliminary review revealed that two of the four
currently pending station applications proposed siting on or directly adjacent
to the Pacific Coast, and are therefore potentially susceptible to impacts from
sea level rise.
The Redondo Beach Energy Project ("RBEP") was proposed to replace the
current natural gas-fired electric generating station at Redondo Beach, on the
coast south of Los Angeles. Its coastal location prompted officials to examine
whether sea level rise would threaten the station. In July 2014, CEC staff
272. The CEC reviews applications pursuant o 20 C.C.R. Chapter 5 (Power Plant Site Certification).
CPUC reviews under CPUC General Order 131-D, Rules Relating to the Planning and Construction of
Electric Generation, Transmission/Power/Distribution Line Facilities and Substations Located in
California (1994), at 2-4, https://perma.cc/CUZ8-BJ8U.
273. The four files reviewed were: Mission Rock Energy Center, 2015-AFC-02 (~7,000 pages),
https://perma.cc/CE49-VAD9; Puente Power Project, 2015-AFC-01 (-34,000 pages), https://perma.cc/
5EBC-R2WG; S Stanton Energy Reliability Center, 2016-AFC-01 (~5,000 pages), https://perma.cc/
49HJ-JMKS; and Redondo Beach Energy Project, 12-AFC-03 (9,000 pages), https://perma.cc/CKB6-
W9A3.
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completed a preliminary analysis of the RBEP application.274 The staff analysis
concluded that the site faced about 17 inches of sea level rise by 2050 and that
this sea level rise would not change storm surge risks at the site.275 Overall, CEC
staff concluded that sea level rise impacts would not be significant enough to war-
rant denying the application.276 However, CEC staff did not have the final word.
The California Coastal Commission ("CCC") is required to contribute to reviews
of coastal power plant applications made to the CEC.277 A year after the CEC
staff analysis, CCC came to the opposite conclusion. Explaining that California
had recently adopted new statewide guidance on sea level rise,278 the CCC deter-
mined that the site could actually see between 32 and 38 inches of sea level rise
over the plant's operating lifetime (2060)-much more than the 17 inches by
2050 used as the baseline in the CEC staff analysis.279 The CCC expressed con-
cern that later in the plant's lifetime, rising seas, combined with storm surge or
tsunami, could overtop the site's perimeter and seriously damage the site, poten-
tially contributing to a serious public safety problem.280 The CCC recommended
assessing alternative sites, or, in the event that the CEC disagreed, investing in
more protection that the applicant had originally proposed.281 In other words, as
of about 2014, the CEC and the CCC had differing views as to which were the
appropriate sea level rise data and projections to use in siting power plants. The
CEC appears to have used information and assumptions that understated the risks
of sea level rise, and the CCC urged the CEC to update its practices. The CCC
advocated using the analytical methods in the then-new state guidance. As of this
writing, the RBEP application is suspended indefinitely.282
The Puente Power Project included the first analysis of sea level rise submitted
by a CEC thermal siting review applicant under the state's 2013 sea level rise
guidance. The proposed plant was to be sited at 14 feet elevation, directly next to
the Pacific Ocean. The project's consultant argued that sea level rise at this loca-
tion, and potential storm surge, would be less than 14 feet and therefore did not
274. CEC, REDONDO BEACH ENERGY PROJECT - PRELIMINARY STAFF ASSESSMENT (CEC-700-2014-
003-PSA), CEC Docket 12-AFC-03 (July 2014) (TN# 202833), https://perma.cc/Y9G7-8EU9.
275. Id. at 5.2-26.
276. Id. 5.2-27 ("Energy Commission staff concludes that the potential adverse cumulative impacts
to project facilities from geologic hazards during its design life are less than significant.").
277. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30413(d).
278. CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA SEA-LEVEL RISE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT
(2013). This was based on NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., SEA-LEVEL RISE FOR THE COASTS OF CALIFORNIA,
OREGON, AND WASHINGTON: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2012), https://perma.cc/5A23-CUA5,
https://perma.cc/T5MJ-7XS8.
279. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, California Coastal Commission 30413(d) Report-Final Approved
Report, CEC Docket 12-AFC-03 (2016) (TN# 205306), at 32 n. 18, https://efiling.energy.ca.gov/
GetDocument.aspx?tn=205306&DocumentContentld=6548.
280. Id. at 33.
281. Id. at 2.
282. CEC, Order Suspending Proceedings, CEC Docket 12-AFC-03(2018) (TN# 206771), at 2,
https://perma.cc/8PXM-HB8F.
2020] 289
THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW
pose a risk.283 The issue was subsequently a major point of contention in the pub-
lic proceedings. In June 2016, the CEC staff presented its analysis, ultimately
concluding that sea level rise could contribute to some flood risk at the site.284
Again, the CCC conducted a review as well, recommending that the CEC move
the project away from the coast because updated projections showed that flood
risk was much higher than the applicant had projected.2 5 The question of sea
level rise subsequently became one of the key contested issues in the proceedings
related to this proposal. The CEC ultimately denied the application for other
reasons.28 6
Although the CPUC reviews electric generating facilities applications, its
reviews are limited to necessity within the structure of grid reliability and
capacity analysis. In this regard, climate adaptation is considered only to the
extent that it is raised as a potential reliability or capacity constraint. The CPUC
conducts its review in part under California Public Utilities Code § 451, which
provides for CPUC review of all electric utility facilities to ensure that he grid
continues to be operated in a safe and reliable matter. As it happens, exactly this
argument was made at the CPUC against the Puente project.287 The CPUC con-
cluded that, despite protests to the contrary, E.O. B-30-15 did not require it to
wait until the CEC's review was finished and that, at least on the evidence pre-
sented to the CPUC at that time, "[b]ased on a review of all of the expert testi-
mony, we find that, during the term of the contract and the expected life of the
plant, the risk of coastal flooding has not been shown to compromise the reliabil-
ity of the proposed project.''2 8 CPUC went on to approve the Puente project,
although it later reopened the case for other reasons.
Unlike temperature and precipitation data relevant to other processes,
California has a centralized system for integrating sea level rise into its decision-
making processes, in the form of its sea level rise guidance.289 The public is aware
of these risks and has ample opportunity to submit protests in well-established
regulatory proceedings. In addition, the CCC has authority to inject its independ-
ent analysis into these processes and has done so to identify risks from sea level
283. AECOM, Technical Memorandum-Sea Level Rise Analysis: Prepared in Support of
Application for Certification, Puente Power Project, attached as Appendix N-2 to Application, Docket
No. 15-AFC-01 (TN# 204220-14), at 58-88, https://perma.cc/6FP6-NPP7.
284. CEC, CEC Docket 15-AFC-01 (2016) (TN# 211885-1), at 4.10-58 to 4.10-60.
285. CCC, California Coastal Commission 30413(d) Report - Final Approved Report, CEC Docket
15-AFC-01 (2016) (TN# 213667), at 37, https://perma.cc/TA5T-T6CB.
286. CEC, Order Terminating Proceeding, CEC Docket 15-AFC-01 (2018) (TN# 226068), at 2,
https://perma.cc/DVX2-WF5X.
287. CPUC D. 16-05-050 (Decision Approving, in Part, Results of Southern California Edison
Company Local Capacity Requirements Request for Offers for Moorpark Sub-Area Pursuant to
Decision 13-02-015) (June 1, 2016), at 13, https://perma.cc/DT8X-4UFC.
288. Id. at 12.
289. Although this section has discussed proceedings using the 2013 version of the guidance, it has
since been updated. CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY & CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SEA LEVEL RISE GUIDANCE: 2018 UPDATE 3 (2018), https://perma.cc/UKC7-PP3Z.
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rise that other agency staff had not completely identified. Overall, there appears
to be a developing consensus regarding the data to be used and, generally, the
extent to which uncertainties in the data need to be addressed. Sea level rise is,
today, delaying and even potentially preventing the construction of coastal power
plants in California. It remains to be seen whether project proposals will begin to
account for this by moving inland, adjusting designs, or incorporating shoreline
armoring and other protective elements.
E. CASE 4: CLIMATE RISK IN AN ELECTRIC RATE CASE
Marking a significant break from past practice, the CPUC recently required
regulated utilities to justify expenditures in part based on a unified risk assess-
ment methodology. Risk assessment is supposed to guide utility decisionmaking
on what to spend, where, and when. The CPUC's determinations on these risk
assessments will govern how much money the utilities can recover from electric
utility ratepayers. This is a unique and problematic risk assessment application:
unique because it has not been done before, problematic because it makes utility
revenues dependent on potentially inscrutable risk modeling. These processes are
relevant to this Article because, among the many risk models now being proposed
and deployed by the utilities, at least one utility-PG&E-developed a climate
risk model. This model, in turn, was used to justify various PG&E expenditures.
As explained below, these models do integrate climate change data-but in ques-
tionable ways.
1. Background: From San Bruno to RAMP
On September 9, 2010, a gas distribution pipeline in a residential neighborhood
within PG&E's service territory ruptured and exploded. The resulting fire killed
eight people and injured many more. For the purposes of this Article, the disaster
is important because it led to several regulatory reforms regarding utility risk
assessment, resulting in processes now relevant to climate change risk assessment
in the electricity sector.
At the time of the San Bruno explosion, PG&E had a risk assessment program
for its natural gas system. Briefly, PG&E maintained a Risk Management Program,
described via Risk Management Procedure ("RMP") documents. Immediately fol-
lowing the San Bruno explosion, pre-existing federal accident response and investi-
gation processes began. The U.S. Department of Transportation's National
Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") investigated the explosion's causes for two
years, as documented in the final Pipeline Accident Report.29 The NTSB found
fault in PG&E's pipeline integrity management practices, as well as the oversight
290. NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/PAR-11/01 PB2011-91650, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC
COMPANY NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINE RUPTURE AND FIRE: SAN BRUNO, CALIFORNIA
SEPTEMBER 9, 2010 - ACCIDENT REPORT (2011), https://perma.cc/9BDF-6286.
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of those practices by the CPUC, and the oversight of the CPUC's program by the
federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ("PHMSA").291
At all levels of regulatory oversight, PG&E's risk assessment program had
been deemed sufficient to protect public health and safety. The system failed to
identify the threat at San Bruno, and, more importantly, the underlying causes of
that threat. In retrospect, there were flaws both in the design of the assessment
tools, and PG&E's execution of the tasks that those tools required to function
properly. From data collection and management o threat identification and risk
assessment, he existence of a risk management ool was not enough to avoid loss
of life.
After San Bruno, the CPUC initiated several investigations that would continue
for the next several years. Meanwhile, the California state legislature reacted by
passing S.B. 705, which provided a single, clear policy directive:
It is the policy of the state that the [CPUC] and each gas corporation place
safety of the public and gas corporation employees as the top priority. The
[CPUC] shall take all reasonable and appropriate actions necessary to carry
out the safety priority policy of this paragraph consistent with the principle of
just and reasonable cost-based rates.
The CPUC later interpreted this to also apply to electric utilities,292 meaning
that from that point forward, all electric utility ratemaking would be conducted
with safety as its number one priority. In practice, this meant that utility ratemak-
ing would be required to incorporate risk assessment going forward.293
The CPUC did this by adjusting its rate case plan. Pursuant to its core utility reg-
ulatory authority, the CPUC conducts General Rate Case ("GRC") proceedings to
291. Id. at xii.
292. This interpretation was codified in S.B. 900 (2014) (Hill) (An act to amend Section 321.1 of,
and to add Section 750 to, the Public Utilities Code, relating to public utilities), 2014 Cal. Stat. 2014 Ch.
552, https://perma.cc/T96R-RF9R.
293. In fact, it began immediately. On March 5, 2012, CPUC Executive Director Paul Clanon sent a
letter to PG&E regarding the utility's upcoming 2014 rate case application. It instructed PG&E to
"perform and provide a risk assessment of its entire system, both gas and electric, and a comparison to
industry best practices." The letter contemplated PG&E's submission of information regarding its risk
management and planning policies and practices, and required PG&E to fund studies, performed by
consultants hired by the CPUC's Safety and Enforcement Division (SED). Letter from Paul Clanon,
Executive Director, CPUC to Tom Bottorff, Senior Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Pacific Gas &
Electric Company (Mar. 5, 2012). PG&E subsequently filed its 2014 rate case application (A.12-11-009,
filed Nov. 15, 2012), SED hired its consultants, and the consultants duly issued their reports. See A.12-
11-009 Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Making Available Reports Published by Safety and
Enforcement Division (May 17, 2013), at 1, https://perma.cc/U9VC-YXPU; Administrative Law
Judge's Ruling Making Available Financial Audit Report on Gas Distribution System (May 31, 2013),
at 2, https://perma.cc/X2E5-3G9R; One consultant focused on PG&E's gas system. Cycla Corporation,
Evaluation of PG&E's 2014 Gas Distribution GRC Filing (May 16, 2013), at iii, https://perma.cc/
VWV9-ECYL. The other focused on its electric system. Liberty Consulting Group, Study of Risk
Assessment and PG&E's GRC (May 6, 2013). The third report is not relevant here, https://perma.cc/
35NN-AWFS.
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determine electric utility revenue requirements and electric consumer rate sched-
ules. The GRC process is governed by a schedule, the Rate Case Plan ("RCP"),
that is updated from time to time to account for new regulatory processes.294
Pursuant to the RCP, electric utilities file GRC applications seeking to ensure reve-
nues sufficient to cover operating costs and to generate a return on capital invest-
ment. As relevant to this discussion, utility costs include maintenance and risk
management, and capital expenditures include system components sufficient to
protect public safety. Prior to 2010, the methodologies employed by utilities to
evaluate risk were not uniform, and no effort was contemplated to make them so.
This changed in CPUC Rulemaking 13-11-006, titled Rulemaking to Develop a
Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework to Evaluate Safety and Reliability
Improvements and Revise the General Rate Case Plan for Energy Utilities.
After some examination, the CPUC adopted a staff proposal that created a
framework for risk assessment in rate cases.295 The general idea was that in rate
case proceedings where utilities request funding for safety-related activities, the
utilities were required to file (1) Safety Model Assessment Proceeding ("S-
MAP") applications, which would be consolidated, and (2) Risk Assessment and
Mitigation Phase ("RAMP") filings in which each utility would "describe how it
plans to assess its risks, and to mitigate and minimize such risks." RAMP filings
were required to contain: (1) "[the] utility's prioritization of the risks it believes it
is facing and a description of the methodology used to determine such risks,"
(2) "[a] description of the controls currently in place, as well as the 'baseline'
costs associated with the current controls," (3) "[the] utility's prioritization of
risk mitigation alternatives, in light of estimated mitigation costs in relation to
risk mitigation benefits," (4) "[the] utility's risk mitigation plan, including an ex-
planation of how the plan takes into account: Utility financial constraints,
Execution Feasibility; Affordability Impacts; Any other constraints identified by
the utility," and (5) "[for] comparison purposes, at least two other alternative mit-
igation plans the utility considered and an explanation of why the utility views
these plans as inferior to the proposal plan." 2 96
Finally, it is important to note that the Commission declined to include reliabil-
ity in its safety assessment processes, except to the extent that it is necessary for
the consideration of safety.297 The Commission declined because: (1) electric util-
ities are already required to provide reliable service (PUC § 451), (2) S.B. 705
294. The current RCP format was laid out in D.89-01-040 (Jan. 27, 1989), at 1. Minor changes have
been made since (e.g., D.92-08-033, D.07-07-004, Appx. A, https://perma.cc/6TG5-FDVH).
295. CPUC, Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Regarding Refined Straw Proposal, R. 13-11-006
(Apr. 17, 2014), at 1, https://perma.cc/XW75-K9KA; CPUC, D. 14-12-025 (Decision Incorporating a
Risk-Based Decision-making Framework into the Rate Case Plan and Modifying Appendix A of
Decision 07-07-004), R. 13-11-006 (Dec. 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/95X4-DB24.
296. D. 4-12-025 at 32.
297. Id. at 19-20 ("Some of the parties raised the issue that the S-MAP and RAMP process should
also make reliability, along with safety, a top priority of the Commission and the energy utilities.").
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"only refers to making safety a top priority," and (3) "[the] energy utilities have
tariff provisions in place that limit liability under certain circumstances. To open
up the S-MAP to ensure reliability could affect those liability limitations, which
in turn could significantly expand the intended scope of the S-MAP process and
S.B. 705."298 "We recognize, however, that reliability-related issues can affect
safety. In such situations, those reliability issues should be included in the assess-
ment of safety."299
2. PG&E's RAMP Filings
PG&E submitted its RAMP filing in late 2017.300 The document was supported
by a series of workpapers that were filed with the CPUC, but which are not cur-
rently available on the CPUC's online public docket. Since the risk model can
only be understood with the assistance of the workpapers, and because the work-
papers should have been made public by the CPUC, this analysis focuses on them
even though they were not currently publicly available.301
PG&E's RAMP acted to support funding requests across all aspects of
PG&E's business. The model is too complex to cover completely here, but under-
standing its basic mechanisms is helpful because, ultimately, one element of the
risk model also seeks to address climate change-related planning expenditures.
The PG&E RAMP model is a collection of twenty-two separate risk models. It
was built using the "@RISK Add in," a third-party Excel add-in for running
Monte Carlo simulations. Each of the models requires inputs for exposure, fre-
quency, consequence severity, and mitigation:
* Exposure parameters include miles of pipeline and other elements that can
fail or otherwise create negative consequences.
* Frequency data are expressions of failure rate, expressed as event counts
per period.
* Consequence severity data capture the damage likely to be caused by any
particular failure state. There are six categories of consequence data:
o injury and fatality rate for a failure (the "safety" parameter) (as
counts),
o remediation and clean-up costs (the "environmental" parameter) (as
dollars),
o grid outage time (the "reliability" parameter) (as customer-outage
minutes),
o investment required to bring system into compliance once failure
occurs (the "compliance" parameter) (as dollars),
298. Id. at 20.
299. Id.
300. PG&E, 2017 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report of Pacific Gas and Electric
Company, I.7-11-003 (Nov. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/EDZ9-96XV.
301. The workpapers were received from PG&E upon request.
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o percentage change in brand favorability (the "trust" parameter) (as a
percentage),
o total financial impact of event (the "financial" parameter) (as dollars).
* Mitigation data account for risk reduction from any specified mitigation
action.
These data are subjected to a variety of statistical calculations to compute a
Multi-Attribute Risk Score ("MARS") for every potential failure state. The
MARS score, and the impact on MARS score of particular mitigation proposals,
is the model's primary output.
Most of the risk models in the PG&E RAMP are "asset" models, which stop at
this point. However, the Climate Resilience risk model is a "cross-cutting"
model, meaning that it combines outputs from numerous other risk models into a
higher-order model. Specifically, the Climate Resilience risk model performs
additional calculations on the outputs from eleven other models: Distribution
Overhead Conductor Primary (model 9), Transmission Overhead Conductor
(model 10), Storage - Wells (model 8), Maintaining System Capacity (model 2),
Compression & Processing Facility (model 6), Measurement & Control Facility
(model 3), Transmission Pipeline (model 1), Hydro Dam Failure (model 13),
Motor Vehicle Safety (model 16), Employee Safety (model 15), and Contractor
Safety (model 14).
In order to model the impact of climate change on these risk categories, PG&E
developed multipliers for each of six climate-change "risk drivers": drought,
wildfire, major storm event days, sea level rise, heat waves, and subsidence. The
multiplier was based on the estimated contribution of each risk driver to each grid
risk, as follows:
* Storm event days: a linear extrapolation of a 30% increase by 2050.
* Sea level rise: based on the NAS data as interpreted by the CCC
* Subsidence: projected changes in drought months per year multiplied by
maximum historic subsidence.
* Heatwaves: maximum daily temperatures based on California consensus
for scenario modeling.
* Wildfire: acres burned in PG&E service territory based on historic data
and future projections of areal increase.
* Drought: number of months of drought per year.
These projections were turned into multipliers that applied to the eleven risk
categories, which then, combined, produced new, aggregate consequence scores.
That is, the model attempts to quantify the impact of, say, heatwaves, on PG&E's
motor vehicle safety program, expressed as a number of injuries per year. The
eleven risk models, times the six risk drivers, divided by additional calculations
to ensure against double-counting, equal the Climate Resilience risk model
outputs.
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Thus, the Climate Resilience risk model provided an estimate of the number of
likely additional injuries and fatalities (three and several hundred per year,
respectively), because of climate change's impacts on the grid. It also produced a
figure of $47 million per year in additional environmental cleanup costs, 105 mil-
lion additional customer outage minutes per year, $33 million per year in compli-
ance costs, an 8.64% trust impact, and $384 million per year financial impact.
Again, the purpose of the model is to support a rate case. As such, the model
ends with a series of expenditure proposals that will require CPUC review and ap-
proval. Although the exact numbers depend on a variety of alternatives, the gen-
eral outlines of the funding request are, roughly, between 2020 and 2022:
* $100,000 per year to research climate impacts on PG&E's grid,
* $40,000 per year to identify and prioritize assets that need to be replaced,
hardened, etc.,
* $30,000 per year to run the existing "Better Together Resilient
Communities" grant program,
* $40,000 per year to create a "climate resilience screening tool,"
* $100,000 per year to develop resilience metrics for use in tracking
progress,
* $100,000 per year to train PG&E staff on climate change adaptation
issues,
* $100,000 to $200,000 per year on a series of "deep dives" into improving
the major storm event days, drought, and subsidence calculations used in
the Climate Resilience risk model (with others to follow in future years).
As an effort to incorporate climate change projections into utility planning pro-
cess, PG&E's RAMP filing is a step forward. The method is well documented,
and best available information on various climate impacts has been incorporated
into all of the other risk assessment frameworks that will guide PG&E's decision-
making. Although the model is very complex and involves statistical applications
that require special expertise to evaluate, it is available for public scrutiny, and a
process exists, in the CPUC's investigation, to see that evaluation done.
However, PG&E's RAMP filing creates more questions than answers. Every
step in the chain of calculations makes potentially unjustifiable assumptions.
Every input requires scrutiny for its appropriateness and accuracy, and every out-
put requires examination for its tendency to support what are, ultimately, the
exercise's entire purpose: to justify a utility rate case.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a thorough inspection of
every aspect of the model, there do appear to be reasons for serious concern.
First, the climate resilience model is built primarily on PG&E staff estimates.
The model inputs are repeatedly described as being built on "guidance from
SMEs," i.e., "subject matter experts" and "RAMP stand-alone risk owners."
There are not currently any methods to validate the judgment of these unnamed
individuals.
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Second, it appears that the complex risk methodology is not, in fact, driving
the line-item expenses that form the basis of the rate case. These expenses are,
rather, pre-determined based on existing spending levels and past practices and
would not be adjusted regardless of the model's outputs. This raises the question
of what purpose, exactly, the model serves.
Third, it is not clear that the methodology truly captures climate risk in any
meaningful way. Again, the outputs of the climate resilience model include the
number of people likely to be injured by climate change's impact on the grid.
This bizarre metric is based on so many assumptions and calculations as to be
essentially meaningless and does not in any way reflect the risk of, for example, a
major fire caused by a downed power line, or a statewide blackout during a
heatwave.
In summary, PG&E has endeavored to build a model of climate change risk
from the ground up, moving from information about possible failure states to
incorporating changes in failure state occurrence based on climate risks, express-
ing the risk of climate change as a change in negative outcomes from failure
states, and proposing expenditures justified by those increased negative out-
comes. The problem with the model is that any break in the chain calls into ques-
tion the entire effort, and, as it stands, most of the links look weak.
CONCLUSION
Part I of this Article developed an idealized framework for assessing climate
adaptation policy assessment and Parts II and III examined how California's pol-
icy development and regulatory integration efforts fare against these standards.
Part II concluded that significant barriers, including especially a lack of leader-
ship and a failure to define evaluative criteria, have prevented successful climate
adaptation policy development in California. Where these processes have
involved the electric power sector, they have largely failed to incorporate input
from key regulators and other stakeholders. The case studies in Part III showed
that California regulatory entities are just beginning to grapple with the difficult
task of translating broad climate adaptation integration goals into specific regula-
tory proceedings and decisionmaking processes.
If any pattern emerges, it is that the proceedings with the greatest public
involvement-the facilities siting reviews-had the most nuanced discussion of
climate risks and were informed to a greater degree about the costs of risk bearing
being allocated by the decisions (equity) and the definition and measurement of
failure states (effectiveness). The nascent efforts to understand the cost implica-
tions of climate adaptation (efficiency) in the general rate case were not promis-
ing. Risk management tools, from fire mapping to complex reliability planning
processes, are not yet accounting for the ongoing loss of stationarity. Equity con-
siderations-particularly liability regimes and public discourse regarding accept-
able risk thresholds-are ssentially nonexistent.
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This Article is agnostic about what, exactly, must be done to prepare human
systems for climate change.30 2 Rather, its animating conviction lies in process.
Regulators are aware that much work remains to be done. Every proceeding and
policy process reviewed above is subject to iterative review and improvement.
Most significantly, the CPUC recently initiated a climate adaptation proceeding
that, if managed well, could begin to address some of the integration challenges
discussed above. What appears to be missing is the constant pressure from partic-
ipants with a primary interest in climate adaptation. Civil society has provided
organizations committed to participating in government proceedings that have
environmental impacts, human health impacts, and ratepayer cost impacts. But
these groups represent current interests, and current perspectives. There is very
little support for the interest of future generations, to insist on the construction of
an infrastructure system, and a governance system, that can withstand a changing
climate. Although this has not emerged after three decades of work in California,
it may soon.
The loss of stationarity confronts policymakers and regulators with their
responsibility to the future, and the fundamental uncertainty that that future
brings. Only the future will tell if today's decisions have protected tomorrow's
interests. With only the past to guide us, it may seem unlikely that this will occur.
But if climate change teaches us anything, it is that past trends do not necessarily
dictate future outcomes.
302. For a recent set of high-quality recommendations for the electric power system, see Anna M.
Brockway & Laurel N. Dunn, Weathering Adaptation: Grid Infrastructure Planning in a Changing
Climate, pre-print available online at https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.02920.
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